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Abstract 
 
 
        In October 1999, the political situation of the Second Republic of Austria changed 
with the centre-right Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian Peoples Party, ÖVP) coming in 
second place in the general elections for the Nationalrat (National Assembly) to the far-
right, populist Freiheitlische Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ), resulting in 
an FPÖ-ÖVP coalition government. This outcome was the culmination of a gradual 
decline in the vote share for the centre-left Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social 
Democratic Party of Austria, SPÖ) and the ÖVP which began with the 1986 general 
elections. This situation was unprecedented in not only post-war Austria, but also in 
post-war Europe. Nowhere else had the far-right achieved such impressive electoral 
successes, let alone been in government. Why was it possible for a new far-right party to 
be so electorally successful in Austria?   
 
         This thesis joins a growing body of literature that looks inside party organisations 
to understand parties’ relative capacities to respond to changes in their environment. It 
demonstrates that, at least in one case, it is unwise to assume that parties behave like 
unitary actors that rationally seek electoral goals. This is because institutional rules inside 
parties privilege some interests in internal power games, shaping whether and how the 
party responds to changes in the composition of interests in the electorate.  
 
         The response of the Austrian party system to the ‘post-industrial’ transformation 
of Austrian society provides a good opportunity to observe the impact of organisation 
on party adaptation to environmental change. The post-war ‘consociational’ organisation 
of the ÖVP and the SPÖ entrenched the power of economic interest groups—labour 
unions, business associations and farmers—within each party organisation and, through 
them, in policymaking. This so-called Proporz system provided a reasonable reflection of 
the composition of social interests in post-war society. It also responded to the 
challenges to Austrian democracy in the post-war environment. However, it proved 
extremely rigid in the face of changing Austrian society.  
 
        Institutional rigidity within the post-war Austrian party system proved ill-suited to 
confront the challenges of post-industrial transformation. Social transformation in 
Austria was not unlike that which had occurred throughout all advanced industrial 
democracies. It undermined traditional class-mass constituencies, such as blue collar 
workers, farmers and small business, while creating a new and largely white collar pool of 
voters. Orthodox conceptions of party change would assume that parties adapt 
automatically to such changes in voter concerns. The SPÖ and ÖVP responded to these 
changes, at best, slow and half-heartedly. This provided an opportunity for the FPÖ to 
target with little competition. It was the entrenched economic interests within the SPÖ 
and ÖVP prevented these parties from offering a credible challenge to the FPÖ for 
these voters.  
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Terms and Abbreviations 
 
 
Important Organisations 
 
Cartellverbund (CV):. A nationwide Catholic university society of students in fraternities. 
Linked to the ÖVP, though Jörg Haider was also a member.   
 
Chambers of Agriculture: Austria-wide elected bodies that represented farmers’ interests. 
Dispensed expert economic and agricultural advice, lobbied government. Dominated by 
the ÖVP/ ÖBB. 
 
Chambers of Commerce: Austria-wide elected bodies that represented businesspeople. 
Dispensed expert economic and business advice, lobbied government. Dominated by the 
ÖVP/ ÖWB.  
 
Chambers of Labour: Austria-wide elected bodies that represented labour. Dispensed 
expert economic and industrial relations advice, lobbied government. Dominated by the 
FSG.  
 
Fraktion Chistlische (FCG): Catholic Lager fraction within the Chambers of Labour and 
Works Councils 
 
Fraktion Sozialistische (FSG): Socialist Lager fraction within the Chambers of Labour and 
Works Councils 
 
Katholische Jugend (KJ): Catholic Youth. Catholic high school students’ organisation. 
 
Katholische Jungscharen: Catholic Youth Squads. Catholic elementary students’ organisation. 
 
Kinderfreunde :Childrens Friends. A Socialist elementary student’s organisation 
 
Österreichischer Arbeiter- un Angestelltenbund (ÖAAB): Austrian Workers and Employees 
League. Constituent league of the ÖVP. Was represented as a minority faction within the 
Chambers of Labour and within the ÖGB.  
 
Österreichischer Bauernbund (ÖBB): Austrian Farmers League. Constituent league of the 
ÖVP. Dominated the Chambers of Agriculture 
 
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB): Austrian Federation of Trade Unions. Heavily 
linked to the SPÖ.  
 
Österreichische Studentenunion (ÖSU): Austrian Students Union. Catholic university students’ 
organisation. 
 
Österreichischer Wirtschaftsbund (ÖWB): Austrian Business League. Constituent league of 
the ÖVP; dominated the Chambers of Commerce.  
 
Sozialistische Jugend (SJ): Socialist Youth. Socialist high school students’ organisation. 
 
ix
Verband Sozialistischer Studenten (VSSt): Society for Socialist Students. Socialist university 
students’ organisation. 
 
Works Councils: Elected bodies within workplaces that represented workers interests to 
management. Dominated by the FSG.  
 
 
Parties 
 
Pre-1945 
 
Christiansozial (CS): Christian Social Party. Represented the Catholic Lager before 1938.  
 
Großdeutsche Volkspartei (GDVP) Greater German Peoples Party. Represented the 
German National Lager before 1938 
 
Sozialdemocratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs (SDAPÖ): Social Democratic Party of Austria. 
Represented the Socialist Lager before 1938.  
 
 
Post 1945 
 
Die Grünen-Die Grünen Alternative (Grünen): The Greens- The Green Alternative 
 
Freiheitlische Partei Österreichs (FPÖ): Freedom Party of Austria 
 
Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ): Communist Party of Austria 
 
Liberales Forum (LIF): Liberal Forum. Broke away from the FPÖ in 1993.  
 
Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) Austrian Peoples Party 
 
Sozialistische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ): Socialist Party of Austria 
 
Verband der Unabhänginen (VdU) League of Independents. Became the FPÖ in 1955.  
 
 
Terms 
 
Lager: Political camps. Founded along class lines and interest groups; acted as self-
sustaining sub-societies that included media, auxiliary organisations, and occupational 
organisations (trade unions, employer organisations). In Austria, the Socialist Lager 
traditionally represented blue collar workers while the Catholic Lager represented 
farmers, self-employed/ small businesspeople, and urban Catholics. The existence of a 
third German National Lager was weakened after 1945; arguably was not overly 
important since then.  
 
Land/ Länder: Provinces of Austria. The latter as plural.  
 
xLagermentalitat: Lager mentality. A term denoting an introverted Lager culture, that 
reinforced a sense of self-sustainability and exclusivity within those cultures. Defined by 
opposition to other Lager. 
 
Lagerparteien: Lager parties. Collective term referring to the parties which represented the 
Lager: the SPÖ and ÖVP.  
 
Umfeld: Term referring to the political domain of the party; represented by ideological 
auxiliary organisations. 
 
Vorfeld: Term referring to the exclusive ‘domain’ of the Lager. 
 
1Introduction: Challenges to Institutions in Changing 
Environments and the Austrian Case Study 
 
 
“To predict the future does not force it to become reality” 
-Franz Blei       
 
 
            In October 1999, the political situation of the Second Republic of Austria 
changed with the centre-right Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian Peoples Party, ÖVP) 
coming in second place in the general elections for the Nationalrat (National Assembly) 
to the far-right, populist Freiheitlische Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ). 
This outcome was the culmination of a gradual decline in the vote share for the centre-
left Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria, SPÖ) and the 
ÖVP which began with the 1986 general elections. During that election and proceeding 
elections through to 1999, the combined vote share of the SPÖ and ÖVP fell from a 
post-World War Two average of about 90% to 60.04% in 1999. Although the SPÖ 
achieved plurality with 33.15%, the ÖVP had fallen to third place with the FPÖ with 
26.9% each. Post-Election, the resulting coalition government was composed of the 
FPÖ as largest party, with an ÖVP chancellor. This situation was unprecedented in not 
only post-war Austria, but also in post-war Europe. There had never been a far-right 
party in government, let alone as the largest party, up until that point. Why was it 
possible for a new far-right party to be so electorally successful in Austria?   
 
           The success of the FPÖ in Austria is interesting precisely because it is so unusual. 
Extreme outcomes, or outliers, provide opportunities to observe particular causal 
relationships more clearly. Standard explanations for the emergence of far-right parties 
focus on voter backlash against post-industrial development and globalisation.1 These 
                                                
1 Ronald Inglehart (1997), Modernization and Postmodernization, Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey, pp. 1-440.  
2developments, however, have taken place across advanced democracies without 
producing far-right electoral successes such as those experienced by the FPÖ. The 
electoral success of the FPÖ raises questions about its electoral competitors and, in 
particular, the capacity of the SPÖ and ÖVP to adapt to the challenges of changing 
social structure. Can the FPÖ’s successes be explained, in part, by the (in)capacity of the 
SPÖ and ÖVP to the changing terms of electoral competition? If so, how do we explain 
the relative ‘adaptive capacities’ of different political parties? 2  
 
            Orthodox explanations of party change fail to take into account variation in the 
capacity of parties to adapt to environmental circumstances. One can use the work of 
Bell, Inglehart and Kircheimer to illustrate how orthodox explanations conceive of a 
relationship between social change and party adaptation. A post-industrial or post-
modern transformation changes the composition of social interests and, therefore, voter 
behaviour.3 Parties, pursuing votes and offices, adjust automatically to changing electoral 
behaviour as espoused by Kircheimer’s post-war transformation from class-mass to 
catch-all parties.4 Obviously, from their own perceptions, neither the SPÖ nor ÖVP 
adjusted automatically or successfully to transformations in Austrian society during the 
1980’s and 1990’s.5 Why did this happen?  
                                                                                                                                           
Herbert Kitschelt with Anthony J McGann (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe, University of 
Michigan Press, Michigan, pp. 1-90 
Hans-Georg Betz (1994) Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe, Macmillan, Basingstoke, Great 
Britain, pp. 1-189 
Terri Givens, (2005), Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
pp. 1-188.  
Pippa Norris (2005) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, pp. 1-366.  
2 Steven Levitsky (2001) ‘Organisation and Labor-Based Party Adaptation: The Transformation of 
Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective, in World Politics, No. 54, pp. 27-56.  
3 Daniel Bell (1999), The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, 3rd Edition, 
Basic Books, New York, pp. 1-616 
Inglehart (1997), Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 1-440 
4 Otto Kircheimer (1966) ‘The Transformation of Western European Party Systems’, in Joseph 
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (ed), Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey, pp. 177-200 
5 Kitschelt (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 159-201.  
3 
            This thesis joins a growing body of literature that suggests that forces inside 
party organisations influence their capacity to adapt to challenges in the external 
environment.6 The leadership and many within the SPÖ and ÖVP realised that 
something had to change. This thesis bridges important gaps in orthodox thinking by 
factoring in party organisational structure as an impediment to party adaptation. Indeed, 
the ÖVP vote declined almost continuously since the 1970 general election; and for the 
SPÖ since the 1983 general election; while the FPÖ vote, though it appeared that they 
would lose Nationalrat representation in 1986, won 9.7% in 1986 and increased this share 
almost every general election until 1999.  Adaptation was not automatic. Indeed, party 
leaders found their hands tied when they attempted to meet the challenges posed by the 
FPÖ. These constraints were found within their own parties.  
 
          To explain the adaptive capacities of the SPÖ and ÖVP one must understand the 
post-war foundations of Austrian consociationalism and the organisational structure of 
the parties themselves. Arend Lijphart coined the term consociationalism to describe the 
situation where dominant socio-economic interests, represented politically by respective 
class-mass parties, coalesce in the face of internal and external threats.7 Post-war Austria 
faced external and internal challenged in the form of Soviet military occupation and 
Communist subversion; forcing Socialist and Catholic forces into coalition. This 
temporary social coalition continued long after the Soviet army departed and Communist 
threat subdued. Consociationalism, however, became a permanent feature of the Second 
Republic; embedded in the very organisations of the SPÖ and ÖVP. The structures of 
these parties institutionalised the influence of the dominant socio-economic interests in 
                                                
6 Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda (1994) ‘An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party 
Change’, in Theoretical Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 259-288  
7 Arend Lijphart (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press, 
Binghamton, pp. 1-248.  
4immediate post-war Austrian society within themselves. The structure of party 
organisations changed more slowly than the structure of Austrian society. This explains 
the sluggish responses of the SPÖ and ÖVP to challenges in their environment, 
particularly the rise of the FPÖ.  
 
           The structure of this thesis aims to explain this hypothesis through four chapters. 
The first chapter will explain how SPÖ and ÖVP, structurally built out of historical and 
cultural circumstances, were tied to coalition government and supported through vast 
networks of hierarchical patronage and control; dominating Austrian politics for most of 
the post-war years . The second chapter will emphasise that the evolution of Austria 
from an industrial to a post-industrial environment undermined their bases; in common 
with every post-industrial democracy, but largely different in the way that both support 
fell dramatically and the continuation of ‘industrial’ interest power despite the decline in 
real influence over the population at large. The third chapter will argue that the success 
of the FPÖ was based on its ability to unite significant segments of industrial voters who 
had been abandoned by their patron parties the SPÖ and ÖVP, together with white 
collar voters who were disillusioned with the status quo; creating a voter base around 
anti-statist populism. The fourth chapter will reveal that SPÖ and ÖVP attempts at 
policy and organisational reform were undermined by the disproportionate structural 
strength of their increasingly unrepresentative, industrially-based interest groups. This 
resulted in rather haphazard and largely moderated changes that failed to reach out to 
new voters, leaving them open to the appeals of the FPÖ.
5Chapter One: What Were the Reasons For SPÖ-ÖVP 
Dominance of Austrian Politics From 1945? 
 
           This chapter examines the impact of consociationalism on the organisations of 
the SPÖ and ÖVP. Consociationalism has been characterised as a system of ‘pillars and 
bridges’ but the literature has focused almost exclusively on the bridges while ignoring 
the equally important structure of the ‘pillars’. This chapter examines the pillars: the 
internal structure of the political parties in particular 
 
          Austria must be understood within the context of its dysfunctional history; namely 
the pillarisation of Austrian society. Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism does 
answer this well by espousing that cooperation between the major political and 
socioeconomic interests in a society can occur after times of disunity and crisis. Austria 
in 1945 was economically and socially ruined because of the War, but also this state was 
created for the second time by the Allies.  
 
           However, orthodox consociational theory of being a temporary situation does not 
go far enough to explain the Austrian outcome because grand coalition governance 
lasted beyond this time of national crisis until 1966 and continued from 1987-1999. 
Despite times where one party could have formed a single party majority government or 
small coalition with VdU/ FPÖ, they chose not to until 1966. Lijphart does not address 
this exception: why did the SPÖ and ÖVP continued this arrangement long after the 
immediate crisis period after 1945 ended? This unanswered question leads to structural 
observations about Austrian politics. What structural incentives within the system could 
have existed that would have convinced the parties that it would be advantageous to 
continue with consociationalism? Did the parties find incentive in staying in power 
together? This begs another question about internal power relationships within the 
6parties. Lijphart talks about an alliance of interests as represented by parties; namely, 
labour, farmers and business. Did these interests, benefiting from governmental power, 
use their positions within party organisations to continue consociationalism? And if so, 
did these interests have a degree of power within their parties that convinced party 
leadership to continue with this arrangement? Lastly, how did Lager elites control their 
supporters, some of whom would have disagreed with the alliance of two very different 
parties for such a long period of time? Firstly, why did  two broad camps or Lager, the 
‘Socialists’ and ‘Catholics’ as represented politically through the SPÖ and ÖVP 
respectively, entered into such an arrangement during most of the Second Republic? 
Secondly, why did a “temporary expedient” became permanent? Thirdly, what were the 
‘vertical’ foundations of Austrian consociationalism? Lastly, how did those controls 
restrain those at the top of the vertical pillars?  
 
Chapter 1.1: Reasons for Socialist and Catholic Lager and Consociational 
Governance in 1945 
 
 
         In April 1945, with the defeat of Nazi Germany and the occupation of the former 
Austrian state by Allied forces, a provisional Austrian government was formed by Soviet, 
American, British and French Allied forces. This government comprised of the three 
‘anti-fascist’ currents: the newly formed socialist SPÖ, the newly formed Catholic ÖVP, 
and the underground communist KPÖ, with cabinet positions divided evenly between 
the three parties. From 1947, with the exit of a weakened KPÖ until 1966, the 
government was an SPÖ-ÖVP grand coalition. However, before 1945, Socialist and 
Catholic Lager were bitterly against each other. The First Republic collapsed in part due 
to bitter rivalry between the two that divided Austria. This subchapter asks, within the 
context of pre-1945 history, why Socialist and Catholic Lager cooperated in a 
consociational arrangement in 1945.  
7 
          The broadest answer is because of the need for unity for the sake of the unity of 
the state, which had never properly existed in Austria before 1945. Lijphart is correct in 
interpreting that times of crisis and disunity often result in a grand coalition as the main 
feature of consociational democracy. Lijphart says, simply, that “…a grand coalition may be 
installed as a temporary expedient to cope with a grave domestic situation or foreign crisis… Grand 
Coalitions have achieved unity and stability during critical transition periods by stilling partisan passions 
and strengthening consensus”.1  
 
          Voting qualifications based on property during the late 19th century meant that 
many supporters of the industrial ‘class-mass’ ChristlichSoziale Partei (Christian Social 
Party, CS) and Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs (Social Democratic Workers 
Party of Austria, SDAPÖ) were prevented from voting; entrenching divisions and 
developing Lager as a parallel ‘states within a state’. This included separate party 
newspapers, trade unions, clubs and associations and even paramilitary wings.2 Political 
tribes acted, according to Pelinka, as “substitute nations”.3 
 
        This continued into the First Republic of Austria from 1918 onwards because the 
abruptness of the Allied creation of Austria in the Treaty of St Germain in 1919 left 
Austrians with Lager identity being primary, culminating in disunity during the First 
Republic and contributing to the eventual downfall of the First Republic in 1938. 
Despite promising grand coalition governments from 1918-1920 between the three 
Lagerparteien, from 1920 onwards until 1932, the SDAPÖ was excluded from government 
                                                
1 Lijphart (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, pp. 28-29.  
2 Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 136-141.  
The German National Lager was unable to become a mass lager like the Socialists or Christian Socials, so 
was less important overall.  
3 Anton Pelinka (1988) ‘The Great Austrian Taboo: The Repression of the Civil War’, in New German 
Critique, No. 43, Special Issue on Austria, p. 71. 
8by coalitions headed by the CS.4 Official exclusion of Socialists from political life after 
the banning of the SDAPÖ, the establishment of the CS-based, Austro-Fascist 
Vaterlandfront government under Engelbert Dolfuß (1933-1934) and Kurt Schuschnigg 
(1934-1938) confirmed divisions. 5  
 
            By 1945, memories of these divisions made an imperative for both Lager for 
national unity to occur. Like in 1918, the Austrian state was yet again created under the 
terms and conditions of the Allies due to the loss of war; but also that Austria was in a 
state of economic ruin and social disunity. What made the two Lager accept that 
cooperation was necessary this time?  
 
            The first factor was the moderation and shared experiences of the representative 
parties. William Blum argues that “…the men who came forward to create a Second Republic either 
had always been moderates… or had been converted to moderate democratic politics by the experiences of 
the concentration camp, war, and life in democratic England”.6 Both parties were moderated due 
to the decline of more radical factions to be displaced by moderate leaders, and the 
moderation of many radicals due to experiences from 1938-1945. SDAPÖ radicals were 
damaged by defeat in the Civil War and subsequent exile. The new SPÖ was led by Karl 
Renner until 1947 and Adolf Schärf 1945-1957; both distinguished as moderates who 
remained in Austria during Anschluss and were instrumental in contacting former CS 
leadership in 1944-1945 about future cooperation.7 Many exiled radicals such as Bruno 
Kreisky were moderated by English and Scandinavian models of democracy and welfare. 
                                                
4Kurt L. Shell (1962) The Transformation of Austrian Socialism, State University of New York, New York, pp. 
14-17. 
From 1945 onwards, the term Lagerparteien will only refer to the SPÖ and ÖVP as respective 
representatives of the Socialist and Catholic Lager. 
5 William T. Bluhm (1973) Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State, Yale 
University Press, London, pp. 35-41.  
6 Ibid, p. 62. 
7 Ibid,  pp. 60-61.  
9Moderates were overall less ideological, more pragmatic, pro-liberal democracy, 
definitely anti-communist, and pro-trade unionism.8  
 
          Like the SPÖ, the ÖVP was a defiantly moderate party because of roots in 
leadership from the former CS who were always moderate or moderate by conversion. 
Initial discussions into the creation of the new party were started by CS trade union 
leader Lois Weinberger, former Farmers League chief and one time Dachau prisoner 
Leopold Figl, and former Business and Trade Association chief Julius Raab.9 All except 
Raab were arrested in Gestapo raids in 1944 and sentenced to death until the Soviet 
occupation of Vienna. During the founding, Figl was appointed chairman, Weinberger 
and Raab deputy chairmen. 
 
            The second factor was the Cold War as a crisis that shepherded the “temporary 
expedient”. For Austria, this was the fear of Soviet influence. Soviet occupation of an 
eastern part of Austria lasted until 1955, and KPÖ presence, which had Soviet support, 
was deemed to be a threat to the survival of the Austrian state; especially given Soviet-
backed communist takeovers in Eastern Europe at that time. The presence of Soviet 
forces in Austria was quite unpopular because of immediate moves against Austrian 
industry and interference in politics. Immediate asset stripping of industry in Soviet 
occupied zone began from 1945; leading to confrontation between the USA and Soviet 
authorities in Austria.10 The KPÖ attempts to infiltrate the ÖGB and an attempted coup 
during a general strike in October 1950 made the communist threat seem more 
immediate.11 As opposed to allying with their left counterparts, the SPÖ cooperated with 
                                                
8 Kurt Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, Little, Brown and Company; Boston, pp. 127-128.  
9 Bluhm (1973) Building an Austrian Nation, pp. 55-58.  
10 Günter Bischof (2002) ‘Allied Plans and Policies for the Occupation of Austria, 1938-1955’, in Rolf 
Steininger, Günter Bischof and Michael Gehler (eds), Austria in the Twentieth Century, pp. 175-178.  
11 Melanie A. Sully (1981) Political Parties and Elections in Austria, C. Hurt & Company, London, pp. 124-126.  
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the ÖVP against the KPÖ; confirming the moderation within the SPÖ. The threat of 
Communism from inside and outside Austria was instrumental in cooperation between 
Lager.  
  
           The third factor of this relationship that was a reason to unite was protection 
against both SPÖ and ÖVP wrongdoing associated with Anschluss and the Second World 
War. This was allowable because of the Moscow Declaration. In 1943 the Allied 
Moscow Declaration had declared that on the one hand that “Austria, the first free country to 
fall to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination” but on the other hand that 
“Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility for participation on the side of Hitlerite 
Germany and that in the final settlement, account will inevitably be taken of her contribution to her 
liberation”.12 There were two main conveniences to be benefited from this. One, the 
legacy of the First Republic and Anschluss needed to be hidden from the public through a 
national unity myth in order to protect the Socialist and Catholic leadership. Both parties 
came to understand not to use the legacy of Anschluss against each other because no 
good would come of “If you ‘de-nazify my Nazi, I will ‘de-nazify’ your Nazi” as it would 
destroy them both.13 Secondly, it helped Austria start anew from separating itself from 
Germany and into a new Austrian identity that was needed for the sake of unity. 
 
             Given these reasons of national unity, both parties sought to moderate 
themselves in order not to repeat the mistakes of the First Republic and forge a new 
national political identity by moderating demands and working together for self and 
mutual interest in building an Austrian national identity. The situation in 1945 was the 
declaration of “Jahr Null” or “Year Zero” for the Republic of Austria. 
                                                
12 David Art (2006) The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, p. 105.  
13 Margarete Lamb-Faffelberger (2003) ‘Beyond “The Sound of Music”: The Quest for Cultural Identity in 
Modern Austria’, in The German Quarterly, Vol. 76, No. 3, p. 290-291.  
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Chapter 1.2: Interest Entrenchment and the Continuation of Consociational 
Governance  
 
           Lijphart’s explanation of why consociationalism can occur applies well to Austria 
in 1945: that a grand coalition could be explained as a “temporary expedient” within the 
context of civil strife, war, and the Communist threat doesn’t properly account for why 
consociationalism continued. The State Treaty of 1955 not only ended Allied occupation 
but also neutrality protected Austria against the Soviets; while economic ruin had been 
eased by reconstruction, spurred on by the Marshall Plan after 1947. This ensured that 
the Soviets would be no threat to Austria; and this occurred after the immediate 
economic ruin of Austria after 1945 and the enactment of the Marshall Plan in 1947. The 
broad answer was that the Lagerparteien, built upon structures based upon interest group 
influence, entrenched themselves in government in order to control their interest and 
protect their constituencies. Austrian society was ‘pillarised’ between two Lager; whose 
parties and associated interest groups leadership provided an umbrella to create each two 
large swathes of society which had different interests.  
 
          There were several factors that were strong incentives for both Lager to remaining 
in government. The first factor was that grand coalition government guaranteed 
protection of ideological interests and domains; whether guaranteeing a say on 
government policy or protecting their own interests. Despite willingness of moderates 
from each party to work together, there were still considerable divisions between Lager. 
SPÖ ideology derived from Austro-Marxism, while ÖVP descended from Austro-
Fascism. Because the Civil War was only a recent occurrence, there were understandable 
tensions between Lager. A grand coalition would have had to base trust upon power 
sharing, based on election results dividing the ‘spoils of state’. Lijphart says 
“…proportionality adds a refinement to the grand coalition concept: not only should all significant 
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segments be represented in decision-making organs, but they should also be represented proportionally”.14 
This stood as a guarantee of representation of the main economic interest groups: trade 
unions, farmers and businessmen. Thus, the post-war system that distributed 
government and bureaucratic posts and public resources between the two major parties 
in proportion to their relative electoral strength, known as Proporz, was born. 
 
           The first main feature, the distribution of power through the awarding of cabinet 
positions, gave parties incentive to stay in grand coalition in order to protect their 
interests over Lager ‘Vorfeld’ or natural domain, also known as segmental autonomy.15 
This coincides with Lijphart’s exception to usual ‘zero-sum’ theory on politics. Lijphart 
claims that in polarised societies there is a greater common good in coming together to 
protect one’s own interests especially in times of instability; and that compromise and 
protection of interests all the time is preferable to possible exclusion from government 
during some of or all of the time.16  
 
          In cabinet, Proporz protected party interests by guaranteeing control over 
interested portfolios and public resources, referred to by Luther as segmental autonomy. 
Lijphart mentions this as a guarantee of security for all parties in order to remain 
influential. Until 1966, the ÖVP was guaranteed Finance, Education, Commerce, 
Agriculture and Defence, while SPÖ was guaranteed Interior, Justice, Social Welfare and 
Transport.17 The nationalisation of 71 strategic industries in 1947 gave parties greater 
opportunities to represent their interests and constituencies. In 1955, the SPÖ was able 
                                                
14 Lijphart (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 39.  
15 Kurt Richard Luther (2007) ‘A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties in 
Consociational Democracy’, in Kurt Richard Luther and Kris Deschouwer (eds) Party Elites In 
Divided Societies: Political Parties In Consociational Democracies, Routledge, London, p. 13. 
16 Lijphart (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 26-30.  
17 Frederick C. Englemann (1966) ‘Austria: the Pooling of Opposition’, in Robert A. Dahl (ed), Political 
Oppositions in Western Democracies, Yale University Press, New Haven, p. 273.  
13
to establish control over industries that were financially beneficial and were a means to 
guarantee patronage to their blue collar support base: with steel, coal, transport, oil, and 
with most heavy industries being placed under the ‘Red’ Ministry of Transport in 1955, 
known as ‘Waldbrunner’s Kingdom’ after the Minister Karl Waldbrunner, while the 
ÖVP controlled two of the three largest banks, under the ‘Black’ Ministry of Finance.18 
Furthermore, Proporz gave a guarantee that ministry staff would be appointed according 
to election result proportions based on who controlled which ministry so that the party 
in control could dispense jobs to Lager members. 19 It was clear from this that both SPÖ 
and ÖVP became integrated into the state because they could now protect their interest 
areas and could control strategic industries for the benefit of their respective Lager.  
 
           The second feature, mutual veto, ensured compromise on contentious areas of 
policy. Lijphart notes this important feature as providing a mechanism to prevent the 
other side from enacting policy that is deemed to be too partisan.20 Compromise was 
enforced through several important mechanisms. Coalition committees that formed 
governments after each election, comprising of important party elites and interest group 
elites, ensured a unanimous vote on policies that were to be implemented as was stated 
in the coalition programs. From 1945-1966, government legislation received unanimous 
approval between 87.2% to 97.6% of the time.21 Even during single party majority 
governments, most laws were passed unanimously. 22  Another mechanism, as 
Engelmann makes mention of, was the concept of Bereichsopposition or opposition within 
the government by each partner in order to ensure compromise. The use of counter 
                                                
18 Bluhm (1973) Building an Austrian Nation, pp. 72-73.  
19 Luther (1992) ‘Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System’, p. 88.  
20 Lijphart (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 36-38. 
21 Wolfgang C. Müller (1993) ‘Executive-Legislative Relations in Austria: 1945-1992’, in Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 473.  
This included KPÖ and FPÖ unanimity as well as for SPÖ and ÖVP. 
22 Ibid, pp. 481-485.  
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balanced ‘Secretaries of State’ as junior cabinet members attached to important 
portfolios which the other party controlled, such as the Chancery and Finance, was used 
to act as a counterbalance.23  
 
        One famous example of how this compromise worked was broadcasting licensing 
in 1957. Opposition to SPÖ plans in 1955 to nationalise all broadcasting under a 
centrally run public corporation resulted in a rather complicated compromise in 1957. 
This included a 26 member board of directors with balanced political representation.24  
 
            The second factor behind the continuance of consociational governance was that 
disproportionate interest group influence within each party’s organisational structure 
kept parties within Proporz because of the benefit to interest groups being influential in 
government. This is evident in certain Ministries that were dominated by Ministers who 
were directly linked to interest groups. Both parties were locked into place because the 
party structures gave disproportionate influence to particular interest groups and vice 
versa, which dominated powerful and influential Chambers. The economic power of the 
Chambers, given compulsory membership of concerned professions, was made stronger 
through the powers granted by government as advisors and within parties as politicians. 
Although they were elected bodies that were supposed to be independent, in reality they 
were dominated by party lists from the early years of the Second Republic. This factor 
must be explained by references to party structures. 
 
                                                
23 Englemann (1966) ‘Austria: the Pooling of Opposition’, pp. 270-271. 
24 Herbert P. Secher (1958), ‘Coalition Government: The Case of the Second Austrian Republic’, in 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 52, No. 3, p. 800. 
During the ÖVP single majority government from 1966-1970, the Minister of Social Welfare, Grete 
Rehor, was an ÖAAB functionary as Deputy Chairwoman of the third largest union in Austria. This shows 
that consociational and corporatist considerations meant that the ÖGB was ‘given a seat at the table’.  
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          SPÖ party structure gave disproportionate power to the trade union body, 
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB), and to ÖGB leadership. In 1983, about 75% of 
all SPÖ members were also members of the ÖGB as members of the Socialist Fraction 
(Fraktion Sozialistische, FSG).25 But this was apparent on all levels of organisation because 
of the ties between SPÖ and ÖGB that made the organisations indistinguishable as part 
of a greater Lager.26  
 
           Structural ‘pillarisation’ of SPÖ and ÖGB into a Socialist Lager successfully 
solidified SPÖ penetration by countering the KPÖ and its attempts at dominating trade 
unionism through infiltration into Work Councils. From 1945, the SPÖ dominated the 
ÖGB, largely based on dominance of pre-war Socialist trade unions using blue collar 
numbers, and the monolithic, hierarchical structure of the ÖGB to retain union 
dominance. The sole right of negotiation of workers wage agreements was given to 
ÖGB, solidifying it as the main organ of the labour movement. The SPÖ successfully 
prevented the KPÖ from challenging its dominance of the labour movement. The KPÖ 
aimed to use grassroots Works Council elections, running left wing ‘unity lists’ in 1947, 
and won more than 20% in the industrial Styria and Lower Austria.27 During September-
October of 1950, the KPÖ attempt to mobilise the Works Councils to take over the 
labour movement by campaigning against the Fourth Wage/ Price Agreement, but failed 
largely due to SPÖ-ÖGB mobilisation of rank and file against it. In 1952, to assure 
                                                
25 Melanie A. Sully (1986) ‘Austrian Social Democracy’ in William E. Paterson and Alistair H. Thomas (ed), 
The Future of Social Democracy: Problems and Prospects of Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe, Oxford 
University Press, USA, p. 166.  
26 The difference with the ÖGB here is that the Chamber of Labour was dominated by the outside 
through earlier politicisation by party-affiliated lists that ran union members and officials, whereas the 
ÖGB was dominated in turn due to FSG-SPÖ links. 
27 William B. Bader (1966), Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
pp. 145-149.  
Shell (1962) The Transformation of Austrian Socialism, pp. 65-71. 
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Socialist dominance and Communist weakness, the SPÖ formalised the politicisation of 
the ÖGB and Chambers of Labour by forming the FSG.  
 
           There were clear links between ÖGB leadership and officeholders and elected 
SPÖ officials, indicating that they were a part of a greater Lager leadership. From 1945, 
all Presidents of the sixteen affiliated unions were both FSG and SPÖ members, and 
from 1945-1986, the same applied to the presidents of the ÖGB, who were 
simultaneously members of the Nationalrat.  
 
               Table 1.1 ÖGB Presidents and the Nationalrat 1945-1986 
President and 
Nationalrat Member 
Posts ÖGB Presidency 
Johann Böhm 
1945-1959 
Deputy President of the 
Nationalrat, 1945-1959 
1945-1959 
Franz Olah 
1948-1966 
Deputy President of the 
Nationalrat, 1959-1961; 
Minister of the Interior 
1963-1964 
1959-1963 
Anton Benya 
1956-1986 
 
President of the  
Nationalrat, 1971-1986 
1963-1986 
Friedrich Verzetnitsch 
1986-2006 
 
Member of the 
Nationalrat, 1986-2006 
1987-2006 
 
Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 81-82, 315 
 
          This reveals Lager ties in which important leadership represented Socialist interests 
through continuing office-holding while in the Nationalrat. In cabinet, the SPÖ-held post 
of Ministry of Social Welfare had, until 1986, been held by an ÖGB representative. In 
the Nationalrat, many SPÖ members have had past careers in the ÖGB. For example, in 
1968, 33 SPÖ members out of 74 were still ÖGB officials.28 ÖGB hierarchy confirms 
                                                
28 Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, p. 233.  
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integration into the Socialist Lager. The structure of the Executive from 1966 confirms 
SPÖ connections at the height of the hierarchy.  
        
                           Table 1.2: ÖGB Executive Composition, 1966. 
Party Grouping Members 
FSG 52 (81%) 
FCG 7 
Communist 4 
Non-Partisan 1 
Total 64 
 
                        Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, p. 301. 
 
          The ÖVP had similar issues with dominance through a division of real structural 
power equally between its three main component organisations: the Österreichischer 
Arbeiter-un Angestelltenbund (ÖAAB, Austrian Workers and Employees League), the 
Österreichischer Bauernbund (ÖBB, Austrian Peasants League), and the Österreichischer 
Wirtschaftsbund (ÖWB Austrian Business League). This issue was far more clear-cut than 
the SPÖ because of clearer structural ties in a decentralised party organisation. Members 
of the leagues, though league members first and foremost, were dual members of the 
ÖVP.  
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                         Table 1.3: Party Membership, 1980.29 
ÖBB 388,863 
ÖWB 152,906 
ÖAAB 271,995 
Others (Youth, 
Pensioners,  
Women) 
354,124 
Total 1,167,888 
   
                Source: Sully (1981) Political Parties and Elections in Austria, p. 74. 
 
        Unlike the centralised SPÖ and the case of ÖGB domination over a Chamber, the 
ÖVP was dominated by these leagues, of which the ÖWB and ÖBB dominated the 
Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture respectively. Elections for these Chambers 
favoured ÖVP lists because of entrenched Lagermentalitat that associated farmers, 
business and employees with the Catholic Lager.  Though membership figures show 
numerical influence of ‘other’ groups within the party, the three leagues dominated. As 
an analogy to Proporz, the leagues represented powerful constituencies, were financially 
self-sufficient, and guaranteed structural representation and the ability to veto decisions 
detrimental to interests.30 The only real change that has been made is in factional 
balances of power. For example, Raab succeeded Figl as party chairman and Chancellor 
of Austria, signalling a shift from the ÖBB to the ÖWB. Ties, nonetheless, have been 
obvious amongst ÖVP leadership.  
         
 
            
                                                
29 Family members counted for 49.7% of members. 
30 Wolfgang C. Müller and Barbara Steininger (1994), ‘Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness: The 
Case of the Austrian Peoples Party, 1945-1992’, in European Journal of Political Research, No. 26, p. 13. 
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           Table 1.4: ÖVP Leadership-Leagues Connections, 1945-2000.31 
Name, and Years of 
Leadership 
Affiliation 
Leopold Figl 
1945-1953 
ÖBB President, 1945 
Julius Raab 
1953-1961 
Chairman of the Chamber of 
Commerce 1946-1953, 1961-1964 
Anfons Gorbach 
1961-1964 
None 
Josef Klaus 
1964-1970 
None 
Josef Taus 
1975-1979 
None32 
Alois Mock 
1979-1989 
ÖAAB Chairman, 1971-1978 
Erhard Busek 
1991-1995 
ÖWB Secretary General 1972-1975 
Wolfgang Schüssel 
1995-2007 
ÖWB Secretary General 1975-1991 
 
Sources: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 91-82, Bluhm (1973) Building an Austrian 
Nation, pp. 55-58, Crepaz (1995) An Institutional Dinosaur: Austrian Corporatism in the 
Post-Industrial Age, p. 82 
 
         Connections between leadership and interest groups are more direct than the SPÖ, 
which never had an ÖGB President as leader. Although they resigned their posts when 
they became leaders onwards, leaders were still linked to the interest groups through past 
affiliations nonetheless; while even future leaders such as Raab, Mock, Busek and 
Schüssel retained their posts while in the Nationalrat. 
 
        Like the SPÖ, ÖVP and interest group ties existed on all levels. In cabinet, interest 
groups similarly dominated particular portfolios. As mentioned above, ÖVP chairmen 
were usually linked to a prominent interest group through prior or incumbent position-
holding. Until 1970, the Minister of Trade and Commerce had an ÖWB background, 
                                                
31 Those left out include shorter term leaders such as Herman Withalm (1970-1971), Karl Schleinzer 
(1971-1975) and Josef Riegler (1989-1991). 
32 Was Chairman of the Board at Austrian Industry Holdings from 1967-1975. This company was a 
corporation of nationalised industrial interests. Reflects nature of Proporz and ÖVP interests. 
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while the Ministers of Agriculture was from the ÖBB. In the Nationalrat, many interest 
group officials were prominent ÖVP members but more so than in the case of the SPÖ.  
  
    Table 1.5: ÖVP Nationalrat Dual League Membership, 1968 Session 
League Number Of Officials as 
Members of Nationalrat 
ÖAAB 13 
ÖBB 23 
ÖWB 14 
Total out of 85 ÖVP Members 
 
50 
 
                     Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, p. 233. 
                        
           The third factor that provided incentive for the parties to stay in consociational 
governance, as a combination of the previous two factors, was that the corporatist 
system of negotiations on policy provided interest groups a strong position of influence 
over social and economic policy. The negotiating positions which they were granted due 
to party influence, regardless of which party was in power, gave interest groups massive 
influence, which could only exist in its strongest through interest groups cooperating in a 
grand coalition government. 
 
           The most prominent and basic of these positions of influence was the inclusion 
in negotiations through organisational positions to form governments and influence 
legislation. All grand coalition cabinets from 1945 were negotiated through coalition 
committees after the elections, which decided the agenda of any government through a 
guarantee of policies that would be enacted in the coming term; stronger if in grand 
coalition. ÖVP delegations included the Chairmen of the three leagues, while SPÖ 
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delegations included ÖGB representatives.33 These groups had a seat at the table 
representing their interests and therefore had a stake in the future, even during the Klaus 
and Kreisky governments of 1966 and 1970 and 1970-1983, major interest groups 
admitted their preference for a grand coalition government.34 One example of this was 
the floated possibility of the SPÖ and the FPÖ in coalition against the ÖVP during the 
Habsburg Crisis in 1961, which was defeated in part by the efforts of trade unionists 
such as future ÖGB President Benya.35 Even with strong control of legislation from the 
centre, legislation was heavily influenced in creation in the Nationalrat because of the high 
number of officials as Nationalrat members, pressure from Lager elites, and intense 
lobbying.36 
 
          This is evident in the feature of inter-group corporatist cooperation. Steiner refers 
to this as a ‘paracoalition’. This began with five Wage-Price Agreements between SPÖ and 
ÖVP, the three Chambers, and the ÖGB, as represented by their leadership, from 1947-
1951, in order to negotiate wage and price increases.37 This developed into a permanent 
advisory board, with the establishment of the Joint Commission on Prices and Wages as 
an interest group advisory body to cabinet on prices and wages. This was negotiated 
between the respective presidents of the ÖGB, Böhm and Olah, and former Chancellor 
and Chairman of the federal Chambers of Commerce, Julius Raab, from 1956-1963.  
 
          The resulting structure, as well as important politicians such as the Chancellor, 
ministers of interior, social welfare, consisted of two representative of each of the three 
                                                
33 Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 253-254. 
34 Ibid, pp. 305-306. 
During the Klaus-ÖVP single majority government from 1966-1970, the Minister of Social Welfare, Grete 
Rehor, was an ÖAAB functionary and Deputy Chairwoman of the third largest union in Austria. This 
shows that consociational and corporatist considerations meant that the ÖGB was still given a ‘seat at the 
table’. 
35 Ibid, pp. 131-132, 315.  
36 Ibid, pp. 307-308.  
37 Ibid, pp. 81-82.  
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chambers and ÖGB.38 The three sub-organs, the Subcommittee on Prices, the 
Subcommittee on Wages, which heard collective bargaining cases from any of the sixteen 
unions, and the Subcommittee for Economic and Social Questions, which negotiated on 
issues of economic and social importance, were similarly structured.39  
 
         The influence and gains for interest groups being negotiators, only possible 
together, were enough incentive to encourage the continuation of this comfortable 
arrangement. 
 
          What can be surmised in this subchapter is that Socialist and Catholic Lager 
continued this consociational arrangement in Austrian politics for most of the post-war 
years because their interests became entrenched in the state. Their stake in government, 
combined with specific interests within the party, meant that this mutual arrangement 
was beneficial insofar as it gave parties and interest groups control over their direct 
ideological, political and socio-economic interests and ensured safe compromises over 
other issues. The three leagues and the ÖGB had incentive in staying within government 
and cooperating with other interest groups because this gave them maximum influence.  
 
         Chapter 1.3: Socialist and Catholic Elite Mechanisms of Control Over Lager 
 
           The previous subchapter raises a further question about the sustainability of 
Lagermentalitat. Lijphart mentions that segmental autonomy of political camps is a major 
feature of consociationalism, but does not delve into how Lager were controlled. How 
were Socialist and Catholic Lager elites able to continue with this given the possibility of 
opposition demands within affiliated interest groups and parties for single party rule 
                                                
38 Ibid, p. 313. 
39 Ibid, pp. 316-317. 
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rather than grand coalition rule? This subchapter will argue that immense politicisation 
of grassroots organisations and membership within Lager, and control by elites over the 
structure of the Lager, placated members and crushed dissent. There were two elements 
to control: political socialisation of the masses through Lager organisations, whether 
party or occupational groups; and party hierarchy control over dissent. First, though, it 
must be shown that Lager were strong during most of the Second Republic.  
 
            Political Lager were a notable feature in Austrian society, as opposed to most 
other Western countries. Political party membership was one example. In the early 
1960s, 26.2% of the Austrian electorate were members of political parties.40 In 1970, the 
peak in figures for both parties, there were 719,389 SPÖ members and 819,397 ÖVP 
members, compared to only 28,000 for the FPÖ and 29,000 for the KPÖ.41 This mass 
base for the main parties meant that they could rely on mass mobilisation for a reliable 
turnout during elections. In 1970, SPÖ members made up 32.4% of its total voters and 
ÖVP members made up about 30% of its total voters.42 This gave the main parties an 
overwhelming edge over non-Lager rivals.  
 
         Furthermore, party loyalty was fairly consistent, making Lager support fairly 
unassailable. Taking a survey sample from 1961, 75% of the core voters for SPÖ and 
57% of ÖVP core considered themselves ‘declared party supporters’.43 In an Ifes survey 
of from 1968 that analysed polling data from the 1959, 1962, 1965 (presidential) and 
                                                
40 Peter Mair (1997) Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.130. 
41 Luther (1992) ‘Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System’, p. 49.  
42Ibid, p. 48.  
43 Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram, and Alfred Grausgruber (1992), ‘The Decline of ‘Lager Mentality’ and the 
New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria’, in West European Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1 p. 21.  
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1966 elections, 27% of voters identified as ‘consistent’ ÖVP voters, 36% as consistent 
SPÖ, and 37% as inconsistent for either party.44 Class identification was clear as well.  
 
               Table 1.6: Party Identification By Relevant Groups, 1954 
Demographic Occupational 
Group (%) 
1954 
Farmers 81 
Self-Employed and Professionals 63 
Blue Collar 78 
White Collar 69 
Average 73 
 
              Source: Ifes Fessel and GfK Surveys, 1968, in Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber (1992),                         
           The Decline of ‘Lager Mentality’ and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria’, 
            p. 26. 
 
           Lastly, there was consistency in voting patterns among family and environment. 
In the same Ifes survey, 67% of respondents voted along the same lines as their fathers 
did when they were children.45 Therefore, it can be understood that Lager political 
support from their natural bases was very consistent from election to election.  
 
         This is best summed up by divisive features that determined Lager. One was class 
and occupation. Socialists were blue collar, unionised and urban; Catholics were self-
employed businesspeople, farmers and some white collar urban workers. Another social 
element needed to be mentioned is religion. Socialists tended to be lapsed Catholic or 
atheist, while Catholics tended to be devoutly religious.46 Class-occupational Lager bases 
were strongly traditional, however, why was it that members stayed loyal after 1945 and 
most of the Second Republic?  
 
                                                
44 Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz (1974), ‘Partisan Stability and the Continuity of a 
Segmented Society: The Austrian Case’, in The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 79, No. 4, p. 953.  
45 Ibid, p. 953. 
46 According to a series of polls from 1954-1961, ÖVP supporters tended towards strong religious values, 
with 67% of supporters claiming to attend Church every Sunday, as opposed to 15% for SPÖ supporters. 
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         There are four main explanations for the ability of Lager elites to sustain loyalty: 
auxiliary control over life activities, auxiliary youth indoctrination, loyalty incentive of 
patronage, and communication indoctrination.  
           Firstly there was auxiliary control of social environments. Luther labels the three 
types of auxiliary organisations associated with the parties: employment, voluntary 
values-based organisations, and voluntary leisure organisations. Employment 
organisations are those previously referred to: fractions inside the Chambers (FSG and 
ÖAAB + FCG for Chambers of Labour, ÖWB for Chambers of Commerce, and ÖBB 
for Chambers of Agriculture) and ÖGB for industrial relations. Luther argues that 
“Fraktionen… directly affect the working lives of their members. Each Chamber is dominated by a 
single Fraktion and thus the working lives of employed persons are significantly influenced by socialist 
Lager politics, while those of the self-employed and of farmers are similarly organised by the Catholic-
conservative Lager politics”.47  
 
Below this level is an example of the representation party-linked groups at the 1963 
ÖGB annual conference. 
 
                             Table 1.7:  1963 ÖGB Conference Delegates 
Party Grouping Delegates  
FSG 287 (73%) 
FCG 63 
Communist 36 
Non-Partisan 5 
Total 391 
 
                           Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, p. 301. 
                                                
47 Luther (1992) ‘Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System’, p.53. 
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On a grassroots level, as mentioned earlier, the SPÖ politicised networks to ensure a lack 
of competition and to ensure their own dominance, using FSG to infiltrate and dominate 
grassroots level control over the Chambers of Labour and the Work Councils.  
 
      Table 1.8: 1959 Chambers of Labour Elections (Federal Total) 
Party List Percentage of Vote 
FSG 68.4 
FCG 18.6 
Communist 6.6 
 
             Source: Shell (1962) The Transformation of Austrian Socialism, pp. 
             284-285. 
 
                  
                  Table 1.9: 1952 Work Council Elections (Federal Total) 
Party List Percentage of Vote 
FSG 59 
Communist 6 
FCG 4 
Non-Party/ Independent 30 
VdU 1 
 
         Source: Shell (1962) The Transformation of Austrian Socialism, p. 286.   
 
 
         Although the ÖAAB (as FCG) was weaker, it still had strong influence within 
white collar professions and the financial employee sector within the ÖGB and 
Chambers of Labour. Meanwhile, the leagues of the ÖVP dominated the Chambers of 
Commerce and Agriculture.  
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       Table 1.10: 1965 Chambers of Commerce Election (Federal Total) 
Party List Total Seats 
ÖWB 9,777 (84.7%) 
FWB (SPÖ) 1,000 (8.6%) 
Independent/ Other 770 (6.7%) 
 
                        Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 292-294 
 
               Table 1.11: 1960-1965 Chambers of Agriculture (Federal Total)        
Party List Total Seats 
ÖBB 219 (86.2%) 
League of Working 
Families (SPÖ) 
21 (8.3%) 
FPÖ list 8 (3.1%) 
 
                Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 292-294. 
 
         With Chamber membership compulsory and high levels of unionisation, it is 
evident that Lager organisations were heavily entrenched in the workplace of interested 
party voting bases; this maximised Lager political socialisation. Given party infiltration 
into the workplace, employment advancement within the organisation or workplace 
would be more likely for notable members of an affiliated organisation. 
 
         Voluntary values-based organisations were linked to the party through obvious 
leadership and activist links, financial support; ideologically connected the base. These 
were linked as part of a feeling of natural Vorfeld, and Umfeld (part of political 
environment) of the relevant Lager party.48 Organisations would include Socialist 
examples such as Sozialistische Jugend (Socialist Youth, 42,000 in 1983) and the Working 
                                                
48 Ibid, pp. 53-54. 
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Group for Sport and Body Culture in Austria (968,000 in 1983) as ideological 
organisations of special interest. The unusually large membership of these groups, 
especially in the case of the latter, is an example of affiliated penetration of Lager into 
subsidiary social activities with political-ideological flavour.  
 
           Voluntary leisure organisations were rather removed from the party because they 
revolve around hobby activities. But there certainly were financial links and the main 
purpose of these is to socialise within Lager and operated within and parallel as separate 
Socialist or Catholic Lager organisations; and included a wide variety of hobbies such as 
the Austrian Club for Automobilists, Motorbikers and Cyclists (ÖVP/ Catholic) and the 
First Austrian Association of Worker-Stamp Collectors (SPÖ/ Socialist).49 
 
          This excessive politicisation of social life was successful to say the least. Steiner 
notes, especially with the more hobby and purpose oriented groups, that the purpose of 
these was that“… members of these organisations are exposed to others with like backgrounds or 
political views.. The members mutually reinforce their identification with their organisation’s views and 
their hostility to those of differing views… Membership in cumulative organised groups also leads to 
primarily partisan friendships, which reinforce, on the primary level, the views held in common”.50 These 
organisations reflect Lagermentalitat of both the functionaries but also of the Lager masses 
themselves.  
  
          Secondly, auxiliary organisations were built around age structures, meaning that 
people could be socialised from an early age through the establishment of parallel 
upbringings, increasing Lager control over social life from the beginning 
 
                                                
49 Ibid, p. 54.  
50 Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 258-259.  
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            Table 1.12: Youth Organisations and Party Links 
Groups Socialist Catholic 
Elementary Kinderfreunde (Childrens  
Friends) 
Katholische Jungscharen 
 (Catholic Youth Squads) 
High School Sozialistische Jugend (SJ, Socialist 
Youth) 
Katholische Jugend (KJ,  
Catholic Youth) 
University Verband Sozialistischer Studenten 
(VSSt, Society for Socialist 
Students) 
Österreichische Studentenunion 
 (ÖSU Austrian Students  
Union), Cartellverbund (CV, 
Catholic Fraternties) 
 
Source: Steiner (1972) Politics of Austria, pp. 258-259, Luther 1992)   Consociationalism, Parties 
and the Party System, p. 54. 
 
          Though this point is brief, it is important to emphasise that Lager could raise 
children from a young age with a distinct world view based on politics and class.   
 
 
          Thirdly, Lager elites could sustain support through patronage of resources and 
protecting supporters’ interests. As parallel societal structures, Lager elites used 
preferential allocation of resources through control of ministries relevant to members 
and control over a district or region, which could provide patronage in exchange for 
loyalty (party membership, serving the party or organisation).51 For example, SPÖ used 
its control of Social Welfare or ÖVP control of Agriculture to deliver to its core 
constituents, or even jobs in controlled Ministries and nationalised industries.52 Serving 
the party through auxiliary groups or interest groups was the best way to earn promotion 
through loyalty to the party, while using this to maintain control from the top of the 
hierarchy.53 Shell notes one prominent example. “The fact that in 1951 the SPÖ was called 
upon to fill 17,221 positions - over 1,000 of them full-time political jobs such as mayoralty, membership 
                                                
51 Ibid, pp. 267-268.  
52 Wolfgang C. Müller (1989) ‘Party Patronage in Austria: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical 
Findings’, in Anton Pelinka and Fritz Plasser (eds)The Austrian Party System, Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado, pp. 332-337.  
Excellent coverage of job and resource patronage in Austria.  
53 Kurt Richard Luther (2007) ‘Must What Goes Up Always Come Down?’ in Kurt Richard Luther and 
Kris Deschouwer (eds) Party Elites In Divided Societies: Political Parties In Consociational Democracies, Routledge, 
London. pp. 56-57.  
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in central and provincial legislatures and governments - amply supports the conclusion that the level of 
District chairman and above, Party functions are almost invariably linked to perquisites, political or 
otherwise, provided by the Party”.54 He furthermore adds that there were 57,588 mostly 
unpaid cadre in 1955.55 Many of these could have benefited from patronage, which 
meant services rendered, as well as continued loyalty.  
 
           Fourthly, communication indoctrination was important due to the ability to 
control information inside Lager that could increase likelihood of loyalty. This was 
achieved in several ways: press, education and functionaries. As separate social entities, 
parties had their own newspapers controlled by the party executives: SPÖ had the party 
newspaper Arbeiter Zeitung and the theoretical organ, Die Zukunft; while ÖVP had the 
semi official, Land-based Volksblatt and the theoretical monthly Österreichische Monatshefte. 
Party media was fairly well perused. Fessel and GfK surveys from the early 1960s exhibit 
that although the independent media was strong (45%), about 35% of voters on average 
read party newspapers as their source of political information.56 The SPÖ furthered this 
through ‘Socialist Education’, using party cadre, numbering 57,588 in 1955, as conduits 
between the central party and the ordinary members through auxiliary organisations and 
collecting of party dues.57 According to Shell, although they largely failed to be 
successful, they did provide a conduit of communication from the elites to the masses; 
which says more about the hierarchical nature of the SPÖ, affiliated organisations. 
Because of ÖVP decentralisation, efforts were largely organised by Lander units and 
League units as well as central office. Nonetheless, party communication to masses 
                                                
54 Shell (1962) The Transformation of Austrian Socialism, p. 82.  
55 Ibid, p. 89.  
56 Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber (1992), ‘The Decline of ‘Lager Mentality’ and the New Model of 
Electoral Competition in Austria’, p. 23.  
57 Shell (1962) The Transformation of Austrian Socialism, pp. 89-93.  
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strengthened Lager-based information that shaped a Lager-based outlook to ensure 
loyalty.  
 
            The second way that Lager leadership used to maintain consistent Lager support 
was using structural dominance to crush opposition to Proporz. This has largely been 
explained already in this chapter by showing real control of organisations being in the 
hands of Lager elites. For interest groups, party infiltration ensured influence, and for the 
party, interest group infiltration helped with compliant members and leadership.  
  
          A reflection of this control was the ability of elites to easily remove or ignore 
alternative viewpoints within Lager on how the parties and interest groups should 
operate. An example for the Socialist Lager was the expulsion of central secretary Erwin 
Scharf in 1947 for advocating a more united left approach with the KPÖ against ÖVP. 
Another is the expulsion of former ÖGB President and SPÖ Minister of the Interior, 
Franz Olah, in 1964. Olah, a pragmatic trade unionist, attempted to use his position to 
overhaul what he deemed to be Austro-Marist doctrine within the SPÖ using Länder 
party organisations to end grand coalition governance with an SPÖ-FPÖ coalition.58 
Opposition by key ÖGB figures defeated him by using corruption charges against him 
based on the donation of ÖGB funds to the FPÖ and was soon expelled from trade 
union and party offices. Lastly, there was SJ youth leader Josef Cap, who rallied against 
what he saw as a drift towards complacency of achieving socialist goals. During the 1982 
party conference, Cap proceeded to attack party privilege by targeting Governor of 
Burgenland, Theodor Kery, for connections between his Chairmanship of the 
                                                
58 Bluhm (1973) Building an Austrian Nation, pp. 120-121. 
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Burgenland electricity company and his cheap personal electricity rates.59 As a result of 
the embarrassment endured by the leadership, Cap was voted off the party executive.60  
 
             The Catholic Lager was not so clear cut as expelling disgruntled members, but 
the issue was more about particular party leaders being unsuccessful at achieving internal 
party reform. The best example of this was ÖVP leaders Josef Klaus (1964-1970) and 
Josef Taus (1975-1979). Klaus, as Chancellor and former Governor of Salzburg, was a 
professional party politician and attempted to reform the arrangement of Proporz by 
governing with a single party majority, which he achieved in the 1966 election. However, 
he ultimately was unable to reform party policy due to League opposition and lost the 
election in 1970. Likewise, Josef Taus, as a businessman and industry manager, 
attempted to reform the party by taking control away league control over membership 
and centralised party policy decision making.61 Taus ultimately failed to make meaningful 
reforms and resigned.  
 
           Elite control over Lager was possible because of a tight grip over members’ social 
lives through auxiliary organisations that were connected to the party and interest 
groups. Hierarchical control by elites effectively neutralised potential opposition to the 
system, which easily crushed through rigid structures and expulsion of dissenters.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
59 Sully (1986) ‘Austrian Social Democracy’, pp. 168-169. 
60 Cap did receive candidacy for the district of Vienna and received enough votes, especially those of 
disgruntled members by running a left wing campaign, in the 1983 election to be elected to the Nationalrat. 
This itself is a good indication of the possible popularity of internal dissent. 
61 Müller and Steininger (1994), ‘Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness: The Case of the Austrian 
Peoples Party, 1945-1992’, pp. 19-20. 
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Conclusion 
 
         The purpose of this first chapter was to show that the Austrian political party 
organisation behaviour could be explained in the context of pillarisation and division of 
society between two Lager; ultimately controlling through elite compromise and control 
of spheres of influence. Both Lager had arisen out of Austro-Hungarian circumstances: 
poorer voter disenfranchisement and a lack of national identity as Austrians. The First 
Republic of 1918-1945 failed because of this division of society into parallel Lager and 
the inability to cooperate; ultimately assisting the eventual downfall of the First Republic 
in 1938. By 1945, successor Lager party leadership comprised of those who had evolved 
politically due to the consequences of the First Republic and the Second World War. 
They moderated sufficiently to deal with the important problems: building a nation 
where there was none, the repercussions of Austrian war involvement, and the threat of 
communism from the Soviets and KPÖ. This was a government that learned from the 
past and had to deal with the situation in 1945 
 
           This arrangement continued in part due to Lagermentalitat of the past, which 
evolved into a mechanism of self-interest. Features such as mutual veto and segmental 
autonomy over portfolios guaranteed compromise and control of interest domains, 
providing interest groups with means to serve their Lager as well as control rank and file. 
The politicisation of interest group elites and party elite into the same Lager made each 
organisation almost indistinguishable. Party and interest groups elites’ influence 
depended on their positions as leaders of their domains but also as negotiators between 
the two Lager and between separate Lager interest groups. Parties remained in 
consociational governance because Proporz guaranteed a stake in the state, economy and 
society, giving segmental autonomy over their Vorfeld; which could only be achieved 
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through interest group corporatism in giving all entrenched economic interest groups 
maximum power.   
 
          Proporz extended to all spheres of society. Each Lager was a parallel society, whose 
elite influence infiltrated every facet of that Lager social realm: employment, interests, 
hobbies, and ages. Lager members were dependent on loyalty and party membership for 
utilities, job promotion, housing and connections. Elites, as representatives, were 
gatekeepers and could provide resources through their control of relevant Ministries, 
districts and organisations. Those who questioned the system were unable to change 
much because of entrenched interests: either being ignored or sacked from relevant 
positions.  
 
          This chapter explains that Proporz locked the two parties into place by entrenching 
Lager control over interests, resources and organisations that dominated daily lives; thus 
acting as gatekeepers for the vast majority of Austrian society. Yet, this must be ended 
on two points. Firstly, if the Austrian people were somehow less dependent on the 
system for resources and that Lager could no longer act as guaranteed gatekeepers to 
resources, then Proporz could not be as powerful in ensuring mass or individual loyalty. 
Secondly, although the elites controlled Proporz through organisational hierarchy, elites 
were also beholden to constituent organisations because of the disproportionate power 
within party organisations. If these constituencies’ grassroots bases were reduced in size 
over time, yet their influence was locked into party structure, how would party policy 
reflect public concerns? By the late 1970s the system was still very strong, but in 1999 
Nationalrat elections, the system of Proporz had symbolically been defeated by the far 
right FPÖ. The next three chapters will look at this massive turn of events and 
developments within the context of the two points.  
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Chapter Two: How Did the Post-Industrialisation of 
Austrian Society Affect the Political Landscape and Hurt the 
Dominance of the SPÖ and ÖVP?  
 
 
 
 
          The previous chapter argued that consociational democracy of the Second 
Republic made Austria a special political case because of the continuation and intensity 
of inter-Lager cooperation and intra-Lager control. From 1945 to 1986, SPÖ and ÖVP 
were the only major political players in Austria, and this system continued to provide 
social and political stability. However, since 1986, there was a marked decline in SPÖ-
ÖVP dominance to the point where their position as absolute dominant players in 
Austrian politics had been revoked due to changing voting patterns. Though in the 1975 
general election the combined SPÖ-ÖVP vote was 85.9%, in 1986, when the newly 
revitalised and more nationalistic FPÖ achieved 9% of the vote, it fell to 75.0%. The 
culmination of this decline occurred in the 1999 elections, when the combined two-party 
vote fell to 60%: 33.15% for the SPÖ and 26.9% for the ÖVP, compared to 26.9% for 
the FPÖ. The object of this chapter is to discuss how post-industrialisation broke the 
stranglehold of the Lagerparteien over the electorate. 
 
          Like other western European states, and indeed, like most other western 
democracies, Austria evolved from an industrial to a post-industrial society. Unlike most 
other western states, mainstream, industrial-based parties suffered massively from a 
decline in their combined share of votes during elections after years of dominance. This 
chapter focuses on post-industrialisation undermining the Lagerparteien. What is notable 
about the FPÖ and other challenging parties was that their success came from issues 
associated with modern, rather than industrial concerns. The FPÖ was built around and 
structured by post-industrialisation. Furthermore, what is notable was that the traditional 
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constituencies of the two major parties, previously whom Lagerparteien relied upon in 
elections, by 1999 voted disproportionately for the FPÖ. Clearly, certain concerns of 
post-industrialisation were not targeted by the two major parties, as well as industrial 
concerns being of lesser importance to the SPÖ and ÖVP. This chapter will require an 
explanation of the importance of post-industrialisation resulting political consequences. 
It will go on to discuss the Austrian case and observe declining voter loyalty and the shift 
of voters so that political changes can be understood within the context of post-
industrial society. Only then can the case studies of parties be fully explored in 
subsequent chapters.  
 
Chapter 2.1: Post-Industrialisation and Societal Changes 
 
            This chapter must begin with an explanation of why post-industrialisation is so 
important to explaining changes in politics from the industrial era. This thesis supports 
post-industrial and post-modernist theory of societal development. Post-industrialisation 
is the process that transforms countries from industrial and agricultural to post-industrial 
service-based societies. The sociologist Daniel Bell, using the American case study in his 
book ‘The Coming of Post Industrial Society’, explained that post-industrial societies 
arose after the Second World War because the growth of industry and the services that 
grew as a result (marketing, sales), urbanisation, and expanded welfare allowed more 
opportunities for poorer people in education. In turn this resulted in an increase in white 
collar jobs through expanded the role of the state through education, healthcare, 
bureaucratic and private sector employment, and that technological advances rendered 
many industrial jobs obsolete.1 White collar employees dominate post-industrial societies 
due to the gains of social mobility of a welfare state, while traditional classes, including 
                                                
1 Bell (1999), The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, pp. 129-133.  
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industrial, urban blue collar workers, small business owners, and rural farmers decline as 
a percentage of the population.2  
 
           Major social changes that occur due to post-industrialisation have expanded and 
changed political spaces insofar as they have introduced new social dynamics to politics. 
Ronald Englehart argues this about the rise of the industrial welfare state:  
“… this has produced unprecedentedly high levels of economic security, giving rise to a cultural feedback 
that is having a major impact on both the economic and political systems of advanced industrial societies. 
This new trajectory shifts authority away from both religion and the state to the individual, with an 
increasing focus on individual concerns such as friends and leisure. Post modernisation deemphasises all 
kinds of authority… allowing much wider range for individual autonomy in the pursuit of individual 
subjective well-being”.3  
Inglehart explains that ‘quality of life’ issues arise from the advances of the welfare state 
and education, leading to an increased focus on freedom from authority and more 
human concerns.4 Political movements have been built more around social issues, which 
was evident during the 1960s in peace movements, feminism, gay liberation and youth 
movements. This has entailed a much larger focus on social issues as well as economic 
issues; turning politics from a spectrum towards an economic-social axis. These issues 
include immigration, environment, law and order, consumer rights, and quality of 
government services. 
         
           As a result, this hurts industrial-based parties, which suffer decline of their natural 
support bases in terms of size and voter turnout. Traditional base constituencies of 
industrial ‘class-mass’ parties such as farmers and self-employed businesspeople to the 
                                                
2 Ibid, pp. 133-136.  
3 Inglehart (1997), Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 74-75.  
4 Ibid, pp.39-41.  
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right, and blue collar workers to the left, have markedly declined because economic 
development has led to the decline in numbers and influence of the traditional groups; 
while these parties respond by focusing more on white collar voters over traditional 
bases.5 Mair, Muller and Plasser state that:  
“… the share of white-collar employees… has increased dramatically, and what is most relevant here is 
that this ‘new middle class’ is considered to lack a prima facie loyalty to any political party… the 
changing class structure is seen to lead to a growth in the ‘available electorate’. On the other hand, this 
obviously presents an opportunity for those parties that previously lacked strong support from specific 
social groups”.6  
Mainstream political parties must reach beyond their traditional bases to white collar 
voters, who are more notably fickle about political loyalties, by appealing strongly to 
their concerns; namely quality of life issues as important issues as well as a de-emphasis 
on industrial ideologies. Those who are most responsive to broad voter concerns tend to 
achieve the best result. 
 
Chapter 2.2: Austria: Socioeconomic Change and The Decline of SPÖ and ÖVP 
 
           Socio-economic changes in Austria have had a much more marked impact upon 
the Austrian political environment because of the factor of Lager networks. At the end of 
the previous chapter, it was noted that the stability of Socialist and Catholic Lager hinged 
on the stability of the numerical strength of political parties. If a larger segment of 
society grew outside Lager societal structures, Lagerparteien could be challenged; if a 
political party was able to successfully target voters on the basis of rejection of the 
system. This did occur in Austria: the larger segment of the population grew out of post-
                                                
5 Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller, Fritz Plasser (2004), ‘Introduction: Electoral Challenges and Party 
Responses’, in Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller and Fritz Plasser, Political Parties and Electoral Change, SAGE 
Publications, London, pp. 2-3. 
6 Ibid, p. 3. 
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industrialisation as white collar voters who were outside the sphere of immediate Lager 
employment or auxiliary organisations. There are two major socio-economic patterns 
with regard to the impact on Lager in the post-industrialisation of Austria: occupational 
change and decline of values networks that have had two main outcomes: the decline of 
the clout of traditional structures through loss of influence, and a lesser ability to retain 
old constituencies. 
 
          The first pattern was occupational structure change due post-industrialisation 
process, which impacted upon the ability of Lagerparteien to rely on traditional bases that 
were rapidly in decline. From the immediate post-war period after 1945, it is evident that 
Austrian society did undergo significant socio-economic change. Notably this was the 
shift from economic production from agriculture and manufacturing to the service 
sector.  
 
         Table 2.1: Workforce Changes 1951-2004 
% of the employed 
population working  
in 
1951 1961 1971 1981 2004 
Agriculture and  
Forestry 
31.6 23.0 15.0 8.5 0.8 
Mining, Industry and  
Trade 
37.6 41.4 42.0 41.0 26.9 
Services 
 
29.8 35.6 42.8 50.5 68.5 
 
Source: (1951-1981) ‘Osterreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt’ (Census Survey), in Fritz Plasser, 
Peter A. Ulram, and Alfred Grausgruber (1992), ‘The Decline of ‘Lager Mentality’ and the New 
Model of Electoral Competition in Austria’, West European Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 20.  2004; 
(2007) ‘Employees By Economic Sectors and Branches, Statistics Austria. Available:  
http://www.statistik.at/statistische_uebersichten/englisch/pdf/c15a_6.pdf (Accessed: 23 May, 
2007). 
 
        Numbers of rural farmer votes declined, hurting ÖVP voter bases, while 
manufacturing and industry also declined, hurting the fortunes of the SPÖ. The service 
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sector rapidly increased to become the largest potential voter bloc. Further statistics 
reveal that class and work structure changed to the point where the white collar 
employees became the largest group. 
 
Table 2.2: Occupational Structure in Austria, 1951-2004. 
% of the employed 
population  
working as 
1951 1961 1971 1981 2004 
Self-Employed 
 
35 29 22 14 N/A 
Blue Collar 
 
45 44 43 44 39.8 
White Collar 
 
20 27 35 42 50.6 
 
Source: (1951-1981) ‘Osterreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt’, in Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 
(1992), ‘The Decline of ‘Lager Mentality’ and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria’, p. 
20.  
 
        ÖVP-leaning self employed/ businesspeople have declined dramatically as a 
percentage of the population, and could be observed as a negative for ÖVP. Blue collar 
workers increased in size but then fell slightly by the 1990s to 2004; similarly negative 
were SPÖ fortunes. Interestingly, observing the size of the blue collar workforce being 
larger than the industrial workforce in the previous table, it is clear that many blue collar 
people became involved in the service industry, most likely in retail and trades jobs. 
White collar employees, increasing in size, again reveal the potential for new political 
targeting by specifically focused policies. 
 
           The second pattern was the decline in importance of traditional values such as 
religion which was a major factor in removing voters from Lager networks. Religious 
support was clear cut in Austria, with deeply religious voters voting overwhelmingly for 
ÖVP, and those with little to no religious activity voting overwhelmingly SPÖ. Though 
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still more important for many ÖVP voters, the percentage of ÖVP voters who attended 
church every Sunday declined from 67% in 1955 to 47% in 1990; while SPÖ religious 
voters remained static from 15% to 12% in the same period.7 This would indicate that 
the religious vote declined and that the ÖVP suffered, but this secular gain evidently did 
not translate into support for either party. 
 
          The first major outcome was that the growth of white collar electorates outside 
auxiliary Lager networks meant that the ability to mobilise voters as a percentage of the 
population significantly reduced, impacting negatively on the relative control of SPÖ-
ÖVP-Lager-corporatist networks upon voters. A more educated citizenry, tending 
towards the private sector, with relatively few ties to Lager networks meant that the rise 
of post-industrial ‘issues’ parties such as Grünen and the FPÖ could be predicated on the 
ability to appeal on the basis of challenging the system (structures, organisation and 
parties).8 Implicit ties of extra-constitutional instruments of Proporz, including the 
chambers and the Joint Commission on Prices and Wages, weakened as a result, 
lessening the ‘gatekeeper’ role of the Lagerparteien. On the other hand, the continuation 
of relative influence of the Chambers, and the rather industrial structures, were unable to 
represent more modern concerns, such as white collar with blue collar union members, 
and modern entrepreneurs over traditional small and medium business regulations and 
concerns as represented by Chambers.9   
 
            The second major outcome was that post-industrialisation of the Austrian 
workforce and economy undermined Proporz because economic conditions meant that 
                                                
7 (Polling company) Fessel and GfK (1955-1990) ‘Political Indicators’, in Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 
(1992), ‘The Decline of ‘Lager Mentality’ and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria’, p. 21. 
8 Peter Gerlich (1992) ‘A Farewell to Corporatism’, in West European Politics’, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 139.  
9 Markus M.L Crepaz (1995) ‘An Institutional Dinosaur: Austrian Corporatism in the Post-
Industrial Age’, in West European Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 77-81.  
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parties could not rely on these constituencies for voter turnout and support, nor could 
they continue to provide full socio-economic security through resources and patronage 
as before. The service sector-based economy saw the rapid decline of Lager 
constituencies as a percentage of the electorate, meaning that their base support had 
been undermined. Furthermore, whether purposeful or as a part of globalisation, 
Lagerparteien were less able to provide patronage through resources and services to their 
traditional constituencies. Globalisation, the shift towards neo-liberalism impacted on 
Austria. Economic reforms began during the grand coalition from 1986-2000 under SPÖ 
Chancellors Franz Vranitsky and Viktor Klima, enacting measures such as and tax 
reform, deregulation, dealing with economic crises such as the Oil Shock of the early 
1980’s, efficiency in payment of state subsidies, nationalised industry management and 
balanced budgets changed the ideological character of both Lager10. Changes including 
subsidies ending or being altered to encourage profitability, nationalised industry priority 
to be more market oriented, income and corporate taxes being lowered, the public sector 
resulted in fewer reasons to support Lagerparteien.11 Reforms also hurt state sector 
workers. 20% of the workforce in nationalised industry was cut from 1985-1987, many 
of them blue collar workers.12 These reforms and the decline of the power of Proporz to 
provide meant that dependents on patronage were no longer guaranteed security and 
favours; thereby Lager roles as ‘gatekeeper’ lessened.  
 
           The overall situation was that white collar voters in the private sector, not directly 
under Lagerparteien patronage or networks, were the future; while traditional Lager 
constituencies were in decline. Post-industrialisation undermined Austrian parties 
                                                
10 Wolfgang C. Müller (1988) ‘Privatising in a Corporatist Economy: The Politics of Privatisation in 
Austria’, in West European Politics, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 103-106.  
11 Volkmar Lauber (1992) ‘Changing Priorities in Austrian Economic Policy, in West European Politics, Vol. 
11, No. 4, pp. 157-162. 
12 Ibid, p. 161. 
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significantly more because of the undermining of Lager networks that previously 
guaranteed such strong support.  
  
         Chapter 2.3: Changing Voter Patterns in Austria, 1986-1999 
 
         The political outcome of post-industrialisation in Austria was a major shift in 
voting patterns that hurt SPÖ and ÖVP dominance; leaving large spaces for political 
competition open to other parties. A Fessel and GfK survey reveals declining party 
identification over time. In 1954, 73% of respondents stated a total identification with a 
party and 27% with no identification, and in 1990 only 49% had total identification and 
51% with none.13 A second example is the decline of loyalties of traditional party voters. 
Self employed and professionals, an ÖVP base, went from 63% identification for a party 
in 1954 to 42% in 1990; and the blue collar workers from 78% identification in 1954 to 
45% in 1990.14 In summation, traditional electorates declined in support and ability to 
turn out large numbers of voters that could swing elections significantly, while white 
collar voters were insufficiently enticed by SPÖ or ÖVP to swing in favour of one or the 
other party because of a lack of auxiliary influence. 
                     
          As a result, the new electorate had more open spaces in terms of voters than 
before, undermining the ability of Lagerparteien to guarantee turnout. Using exit poll data 
from the general elections of 1990, Plasser, Ulram and Grausgruber compiled what they 
would deem the new voter groups according to their loyalties or lack thereof. 
 
 
                                                
13 (Polling company) Fessel and GfK (1954-1990) ‘Political Indicators’ in Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber 
(1992), ‘The Decline of ‘Lager Mentality’ and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria’, p. 25.  
14 Ibid, p. 26. 
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Table 2.3: New Electoral Loyalty in Terms of Voter Preference, 1990 
Cluster % of  
Electorate 
Type of 
Competition 
Combined  
Vote of SPÖ and 
ÖVP 
Close  
Party ties 
White 
Collar
Blue  
Collar 
Social 
Democratic 
 
Bourgeois 
 
Rural Catholic 
23.2 
 
 
6.1 
 
4.3 
 
 
No  
competition 
 
 
90.2 
 
 
55.3 
 
 
25.3 
 
 
55.4 
Traditional  
Lager  
competition 
11.4 Traditional  
two party 
competition 
90.6 51.8 35.9 55.8 
Welfare state  
new middle 
 
Market oriented 
middle  
 
28.1 
 
 
 
18.0 
Open, multi- 
party  
competition  
(with SPÖ- 
ÖVP  
advantage) 
 
 
66.6 
 
 
2.5 
 
 
80.8 
 
 
2.0 
Populist blue  
collar protest 
 
Urban white  
collar protest 
 
5.8 
 
 
 
3.1 
 
Open,  
multi-party 
competition 
 
 
47.6 
 
 
4.7 
 
 
48.2 
 
 
37.2 
 
Source: (Polling company) Fessel and GfK (1954-1990) ‘Political Indicators’  in Plasser, Ulram, and 
Grausgruber (1992), ‘The Decline of ‘Lager Mentality’ and the New Model of Electoral Competition 
in Austria’, p. 38.  
 
           Traditional SPÖ-ÖVP voter bases notably declined when compared to the more 
open segments of the population whom espouse little loyalty to any party. Although 
both the welfare and market oriented had preference for one of the two parties, 33.15% 
of those who voted for the opposition and protest voters voted 52.4% for third parties, 
revealing a large proportion of the population who outside of the auxiliary reach of the 
SPÖ or ÖVP. Lager bases were not nearly as strong as they once were. About half the 
electorate had no immediate tendency towards Lager. The ÖVP and SPÖ could not rely 
on as larger percentage of the voting population as they did in the past. 
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          Looking closer at this, the younger, larger white collar generations combined with 
the decline of traditional industrial constituencies meant more open political spaces in 
post-industrial Austria. 
           
            Table 2.4: Voter Demographics and Preferences of Austria, 1999 
Social Groups Voters (As a  
Percentage of the  
electorate) 
Percentage of the group  
who changed vote since 
1995 
Age 
<30 
30-44 
45-59 
60-69 
70 
Total 
 
21 
32 
28 
11 
9 
100 
 
20 
44 
24 
8 
4 
100 
Profession 
Self employed, 
professionals, 
farmers, 
businesspeople 
White Collar 
Blue Collar 
Pensioners 
Total 
 
11 
 
 
31 
15 
20 
100 
 
13 
 
 
38 
11 
13 
100 
Education 
Primary 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
Total 
 
17 
46 
37 
100 
 
10 
40 
50 
100 
 
Source: Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram and Franz Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 
1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive’, ZAP: Center for Applied Political Research, 
Available: www.zap.or.at, Accessed 13th May, 2007, p. 21.15  
 
         Those who changed their vote since 1995 tended to be the younger to middle 30-
44 age category (32% of voters and 44% changing votes), white collar (31% and 38%), 
and secondary (46% and 40%) and tertiary (37% and 50%) educated.16 This denotes 
                                                
15 nb/ These surveys are based on polls and preliminary results.  
16 Secondary educated voters (46% of the electorate, 40% changed vote since 1995) could be explained in 
several ways. One would be white collar through the service sector (office, retail) or trade-school trade 
school educated blue collar workers. This would not necessarily indicate white collar employment, but 
more about removal from Lagermantalitat. 
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middle aged and white collar voter open spaces, which may also be associated with some 
volatility amongst the younger 18-30 and 45-59 brackets. Traditional groups within the 
electorate were smaller than in the past but also not noticeably volatile. ‘Self employed’ 
made up only 11% of the electorate and only 13% changed their vote, while blue collar 
workers made up 15% and only 11% changed respectively. This can also be correlated 
with older voters, specifically pensioners (20% and 13%), who could be argued to be 
more indoctrinated through greater Lagermentalitat in the past; and primary educated 
(17% and 10%) in a similar situation. 
 
            Comparing election results throughout the defined period of change, 1986-1999, 
it is evident that there was a significant shift of votes among all occupational groups: 
those who were previously reliable Lagerparteien voters or at least had tended towards the 
SPÖ and ÖVP, and those white collar voters. These statistics were taken as part of voter 
exit polls in the election years.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Given the sheer significance of FPÖ results, Grünen and Liberales Forum (LIF) results will not be 
     Compared, though may be mentioned when important.                  
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Table 2.5: Occupation and Austrian Voter Patterns, 1986-1999 
 
Occupation SPÖ 
1986 
SPÖ  
1994 
SPÖ 
1999 
ÖVP  
1986 
ÖVP  
1994 
ÖVP  
1999 
FPÖ  
1986 
FPÖ  
1994 
FPÖ  
1999 
Farmers 
 
1 8 1 93 73 87 5 15 10 
Self  
Employed, 
Managers 
14 10 10 60 40 41 15 30 33 
White Collar 
 
57 29 36 36 25 23 13 22 22 
Blue Collar 
 
49 47 35 27 15 12 10 29 47 
     Total           43.1      34.9     33.4    41.3      27.7      26.9        9.7       22.5      27.2 
 
Sources: Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram and Wolfgang C. Müller (1995), Wahlerverhalten und 
Parteienwettbewerg: Analysen zur Nationalratswahl, Signum Verlag, in Givens, (2005), Voting 
Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 56, 65; Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der 
Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 21. 
 
           Both traditional Lager voters and white collar voters shifted their votes 
significantly. Significant numbers of ÖVP-leaning self employed changed their votes in 
large numbers (60% in 1986 to 40% in 1999) to FPÖ (15% to 33%). White collar voters 
tended towards the SPÖ in 1986, and although there was a decline, by 1999 it was clear 
that the SPÖ was more of a white collar, socially liberal party, though not 
overwhelmingly. ÖVP never recovered white collar votes but interestingly became about 
even with FPÖ (23% to 22% in 1999 respectively). FPÖ gained white collar votes, 
probably from both parties. Most of the rest of the white collar vote (15%) went to the 
Grünen and LIF in 1999.18 More striking is the massive decline of the blue collar vote, 
seemingly directly from ÖVP at first, then SPÖ to FPÖ; with the FPÖ for the first time 
gaining plurality amongst blue collar voters, dealing a significant blow to SPÖ. The only 
exception were farmers, though as a smaller percentage of the population as they once 
                                                
18 Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und 
Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 21. 10% and 5% of white collar voters voted Grünen and LIF respectively. 
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were, their clout was lessened and so arguably was the traditional ÖVP base. 
Occupational figures reveal overall that the FPÖ gained at the expense of both parties. 
 
         Though only taking from the 1986-1994 results, the shift in voters dependent on 
education levels provides a clear trend away from the SPÖ and ÖVP. 
 
         Table 2.6: Education Levels and Austrian Voting Patterns, 1986-1999 
Education SPÖ  
1986 
SPÖ  
1994 
ÖVP  
1986 
ÖVP  
1994 
FPÖ  
1986 
FPÖ  
1994 
Primary 
 
47 45 42 28 6 21 
Secondary 
 
45 50 38 24 11 26 
Tertiary 
 
29  19 46 32 11 19 
              Total             43.1        34.9       41.3          27.7         9.7         22.5      
 
Sources: Plasser, Ulram and Müller (1995), Wahlerverhalten und Parteienwettbewerg: Analysen zur 
Nationalratswahl, in Givens (2005), Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 56, 65. 
 
 
         Voters with a primary education show a correlation of change from ÖVP to FPÖ, 
including some blue collar workers, some farmers and self employed. Many university-
educated voters switched from both the SPÖ and ÖVP to the FPÖ, though many voted 
for Grünen and LIF.19 Most interesting is that many voters with a secondary education, 
such as trade schools and retail, changed from the ÖVP; many likely voted FPÖ. Like 
occupation, voters of all education levels shifted from SPÖ and ÖVP to FPÖ.  
 
          Another interesting account to make is age because this is reflective of 
generational differences between ‘industrial’ and ‘post industrial’ generations. 
 
                                                
19 Ibid, pp. 56, 65 
16% of tertiary voters for Grünen in 1994. 
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                   Table 2.7: Age and Austrian Voters, 1986-1999 
Age SPÖ  
1986 
SPÖ  
1994 
SPÖ  
1999 
ÖVP  
1986 
ÖVP 
1994 
ÖVP  
1999 
FPÖ 
1986 
FPÖ 
1994 
FPÖ  
1999 
18-30* 39 31 25 33 19 17 12 25 35 
31-44** 43 31 32 37 26 23 11 22 29 
45-59 42 37 35 48 30 32 6 22 21 
60+*** 45 48 39 44 33 31 8 22 25 
Total       43.1     34.9      33.4      41.3      27.7     26.9      9.7      22.5     27.2 
 
Sources: Plasser, Ulram and Müller (1995), Wahlerverhalten und Parteienwettbewerg: Analysen zur 
Nationalratswahl, in Givens (2005), Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 56, 65; Plasser, 
Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und 
Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 21. 
 
         The voter statistics clearly show that the younger generations, both the 18-30 and 
31-44 blocs, voted disproportionately less for the SPÖ and ÖVP. Only with voters aged 
49-59 and 60 did SPÖ and ÖVP match or exceed their average vote, perhaps due to 
more likely Lagermentalitat of the older generation. However, this is balanced off with an 
extra age 60-69 statistic from 1999 that has the FPÖ on 21%.20 The FPÖ did 
disproportionately well amongst younger voters (18-30 35% and 31-44 29% in 1999) and 
poorer (with previous exception) amongst older voters. Looking at age voting statistics it 
is clear that the older, ‘industrial’ generations reveal a disposition for the SPÖ and ÖVP; 
while younger, post-industrial generations disproportionately voted in lower numbers for 
the SPÖ and ÖVP, and with FPÖ the main beneficiary of younger votes.    
 
         An overall analysis shows that voter volatility increased in Austria from 1986-1999. 
Firstly, what should be noted is that the combined vote for the SPÖ and ÖVP has fallen 
from 84.4% in 1986 to 62.6% in 1994 and then to 60.3% in 1999. This reflects more 
volatility and less Lager hold. Secondly, the SPÖ, but especially the ÖVP, lost white collar 
voters to the Grünen, LIF, but especially the FPÖ, supporting that these parties had more 
opportunities in a post-industrial setting. Thirdly, both SPÖ but especially ÖVP lost 
                                                
20 Ibid, p. 21. 
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their traditional industrial base support to the FPÖ. The FPÖ gained significant blue 
collar firstly from the ÖVP but then from the SPÖ so that by 1999 it overtook the SPÖ 
in terms of blue collar votes. The shift of ÖVP self-employed base to the FPÖ (though 
still holding dominance) was also significant. The shift of significant bases away from the 
parties signified the end of Lager monopolies over respective core bases. Fourthly, the 
SPÖ, although lost a significant amount of its original white collar vote, was able to 
retain a sizeable plurality; making the SPÖ the largest ‘white collar party’ as its largest 
occupational base, reflecting it’s appeal but also that something had undermined its share 
nonetheless. Fourthly, the ÖVP can be concluded to be the biggest loser, suggesting that 
the FPÖ outperformed the ÖVP in terms of targeting constituencies, which will be 
revealed in the next chapter. Fifthly, there was a rise in FPÖ support across the board 
for age groups but especially the young, but it is more a reflection of generational 
attitudes to the parties.   
 
          Conclusion 
 
           The process of post-industrialisation since 1945, resulting in changing 
socioeconomic structures in society, changing attitudes and a more volatile and changed 
economic paradigm has challenged political parties to adapt. This chapter explained how 
socioeconomic changes occurred and broke the hold that Proporz and Lagermentalitat had, 
which disappeared because of their declining base: a higher percentage of white collar 
voters outside Lager networks, and the abandonment of industrial political meant less 
likelihood of support from former targeted constituencies. The major parties did not 
hold the clout that they once did due to the decline of patronage and the reach of 
auxiliary organisation, so their shares of the vote declined. Notably, the bulk of shifting 
votes went from SPÖ and ÖVP to FPÖ. Therefore, this chapter explains that, when 
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faced with changing political environments, the SPÖ and ÖVP failed to adapt to a post-
industrial political environment; evident in election results from 1986-1999. From here, it 
must be asked why both SPÖ and ÖVP took such a massive decline in a period of less 
than 20 years, and why they did not make necessary changes to policy and organisation 
in order to successfully target white collar voters. A telling clue here is that FPÖ did so 
well by appealing to and receiving the votes of those better off and those worse off due 
to post-industrialisation. Why did they appeal to such a broad spectrum of society? The 
next chapter will explore the reasons why FPÖ did so well amongst Lager party base and 
those volatile voters. 
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Chapter Three: How Did the FPÖ benefit From a Collapse 
in the Combined SPÖ-ÖVP Vote? 
 
 
 
 
           The previous chapter looked at the socio-economic situation that fundamentally 
changed Austria from being an industrial to a post-industrial society, resulting in the 
decline in voter share for the main parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP. In general elections from 
1986 to 1999, SPÖ-ÖVP share of the vote declined rapidly, with the overwhelming bulk 
of volatile voters changing to the FPÖ, culminating in it receiving 26.9% of the vote in 
the 1999 elections. This must be seen within the context of a wider post-industrial shift 
in terms of electorate make up, shifts in public concerns, and the ability of political 
parties to respond to this.  
 
            The previous chapter noted statistical information which showed that the FPÖ 
united blue collar, white collar, young and middle aged people behind the party. This 
chapter will explain that the FPÖ, of all third parties, was able to be the main beneficiary 
of a shift in voting behaviour because of its ability to form a cross-societal coalition that 
united blue collar, white collar, young and middle aged people specifically. The 
environmentalist left Grünen and the liberal LIF were both unable to match FPÖ 
successes. Kitschelt pondered possible appeals that the far right could have to a broad 
cross-section of society, saying: 
“… it (the far right) can appeal to a cross-class alliance: it attracts segments of the working class based 
on racist-xenophobic and authoritarian appeals. It rallies small business on additional promarket and 
anti-state slogans, calling for the dismantling of public bureaucracies and the welfare state”.1 This is an 
apt statement with regards to Austria because it appears that the biggest vote collapse 
                                                
1 Kitschelt (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe, p. 19. 
53
was with the ÖVP, which came third to the FPÖ. This is important to indicate how the 
FPÖ targeted its appeal, and how that appeal was so well targeted towards such a wide 
range of voters: both traditional Lager constituencies who did poorly out of post-
industrialisation, and white collar voters who did well. These could be termed ‘losers’ 
and ‘winners’ of post-industrialisation respectively.  
         
           This chapter will look the changes in politics from an industrial to a post-
industrial society and will look at the Austrian case study as an example of open political 
spaces that were successfully targeted by the FPÖ. Specifically, this chapter will look at 
how the FPÖ appealed to both the winners and losers of post-industrialisation, and from 
which party their votes might have come from. Also important is why the LIF and 
Grünen were not able to successfully take advantage of the new political spaces to the 
extent that the FPÖ was able to. From this, it must be ascertained how the FPÖ 
appealed broadly to a cross-societal coalition and what it could offer to a broader range 
of the electorate. As a post-industrial party, what gave it an edge over traditional 
industrial-based parties?  
 
Chapter 3.1: The Austrian Political Landscape and Post-Industrialisation 
Competition 
 
         To begin this chapter, it must be ascertained how the political landscape changed 
and how the FPÖ was able to benefit from the new opportunities from the growth of 
segments of society who were no longer part of the network of the two Lager. As a result 
of Austrian realignment, the FPÖ was able to take advantage of new spaces that became 
unaligned and segments that were never aligned and had grown in numbers.  
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          Kitschelt argues that the far-right benefited from the introduction of a social 
dimension to politics that realigned the centre left towards left-libertarianism and the 
centre right towards right authoritarianism, and the economic shift towards the centre by 
centre-left and centre-right parties. This is associated with the general shift of the 
political mainstream from an industrial mainstream to a post-industrial mainstream.  
 
             Figure 3.1: The Competitive Space for Political Parties in Europe, 1980’s 
 
Source: Adapted from Kitschelt (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe, p. 15. 
 
55
            The introduction of a social dimension to politics which combined less 
doctrinaire ideology of post-industrialisation has meant changes for both the mainstream 
left and right elements. The industrial centre-left (SD) becomes more socially liberal, 
probably due to social reforms, advocating feminism, gay rights and minority rights, and 
becomes less economically doctrinaire and more towards a neo-liberal direction, so tries 
to gain voters from SD1 to SD2. Likewise, the industrial centre-right (CR) attempts to 
capture socially conservative voters as opposed to social liberals, and enters economic 
consensus with the centre-left towards a more neo-liberal economic model, meaning a 
shift towards C1 and C2. Overall, this has three main outcomes for major parties. Firstly, 
there is realignment from a Keynesian to a neo-liberal economic consensus. This is 
influenced by international trends from the 1980s onwards. Secondly, the centre-left and 
centre-right, in shifting emphasis on policy, each experience a shift in their general voter 
catchments areas, as shown on the axis. Thirdly, the abandonment of industrial 
catchments in favour of post-industrial white collar catchments leads to a disassociation 
with the former, therefore leaving them targets for other political parties’ focus. In 
theory, this would help account for the rise of the far-right in many Western post-
industrial democracies. 
 
           The Austrian case largely reflects this theory, yet, because of the specialty of 
institutional Lagermentalitat, political spaces became far more open for third party 
competition. Because Austrian analysis must take into account internal party structure, 
consociationalism, grand coalition government and Proporz, the parties must be seen as 
less politically different than has usually been the case.   
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Figure 3.2: Competitive Space in the Austrian Political Axis, 1986-1999 
 
Source: Adapted from Kitschelt (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe, p. 184. 
 
         The closeness of the SPÖ and the ÖVP means that there are more contestable 
spaces for other parties to gain from. Kitschelt argues that: 
 “Among the remaining highly advanced countries, the opportunities for the extreme-rightist mobilisation 
depend on the convergence between moderate left and moderate right parties. If the distance between these 
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parties is relatively small, political entrepreneurs have a chance to create a successful electoral coalition 
with a right-authoritarian agenda. Where “partocracy” in a country’s political economy prevails, such 
entrepreneurs should be able to broaden their electorate beyond the right-authoritarian core through 
populist antistatist messages and actually build a very strong “cross-class” alliance against the established 
parties”.2 
 
           Even with different interests and ideological orientation, Proporz and the re-
emergence of grand coalition government in 1986 means that in practice, the parties 
were close together; especially in terms of economics. This further isolated traditional 
Lager voters in both parties as well as a large number of white collar voters economically 
to the right of both the ÖVP and LIF and/or voters disenchanted with Proporz. 
Therefore, the FPÖ was able to attract a cross-societal coalition of voters, which were 
voters previously aligned to Lagerparteien and white collar voters.  Interestingly, the FPÖ 
positioned itself to the right of the ÖVP, so was able to squeeze the ÖVP, as well as the 
new LIF, between the SPÖ and itself. What remains to be seen is how exactly the FPÖ 
successfully targeted such a wide cross-section of society.  
 
Chapter 3.2: The FPÖ and the Appeal to the ‘Losers’ of Post-Industrialisation  
 
 
          The most interesting part of the voter base of the FPÖ was the disproportionate 
support of groups who formerly voted SPÖ and ÖVP; namely blue collar workers and 
self-employed, who made up a combined total of 37% of their base (27% and 10% 
respectively).3  
                                                
2 Ibid, p. 53.  
3 Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und 
Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 21. 
nb/ Given the continual dominance of the ÖVP over farmers’ vote, only self employed and blue collar 
workers will be considered the ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation in Austria.   
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          The overarching reason for the significant loss must be the abandonment by 
Lagerparteien of traditional base concerns in an attempt to reach out to white collar voters. 
Betz argues that during post-industrialisation, unskilled and semi-skilled blue collar 
workers lose previous security of employment and economic opportunities and thus 
become more insecure about the future. 4 This is also relevant for the small businesses 
such as retailers and manufacturers, many of whom could not compete against larger 
service sector firms that grew out of a post-industrial economic environment. 
 
         The key difference with Austria, is that Lager, previously being ‘gatekeepers’, could 
no longer guarantee security and patronage; thus previously secure constituencies were 
now open political spaces.5 In attempting to realign towards white collar concerns, the 
SPÖ and ÖVP coalition from 1986-2000 liberalised the Austrian economy towards a 
more neo-liberal market model; somewhat moving away from industrial political spaces. 
This was most significant in economic reforms enacted by the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition of 
1986-1999, such as deregulation, nationalised industry efficiency measures including 
redundancies, public spending cuts, market deregulation, and the entry into the EU in 
1995. Although this was moderate in international terms, Lagerparteien made a major shift 
in Austrian terms. White collar workers, being in jobs with arguably more employment 
security and less affected by privatisation, better working conditions and opportunities 
for promotion, were favoured; blue collar workers suffered from less job security and 
less attention paid to their concerns. As a result, these people were now open to political 
competition as they were no longer the main focus of their traditional Lagerparteien. 
 
                                                
4 Betz (1994) Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe, p. 176.  
5 Luther (2007) ‘Must What Goes Up Always Come Down?’ p. 68.  
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           With economic issues becoming more bi-partisan between the Lagerparteien, while 
being largely unresponsive to economic change, appeals could be made to the ‘losers’ of 
post-industrialisation through social issues. The FPÖ was able to attract the ‘losers’ 
through targeted appeals to the instability and insecurities suffered by them in a post-
industrial society. Kitschelt puts this simply by saying: “…the rise of extreme rightist electorates 
voicing great disaffection with all the democratic parties is fuelled in part, but not exclusively, by the 
dissatisfaction of less skilled labourers with declining labour market opportunities and high structural 
unemployment…”6 With economic realignment, social issues became a source of meaning 
and debate for people.  
 
         Firstly, the appeal to both blue collar workers and self-employed and small 
businesspeople was done by appealing to socially authoritarian spaces that were 
neglected by the Lagerparteien; using job security, immigration and welfare chauvinism. 
The FPÖ appealed strongly to those blue collar constituencies abandoned by the SPÖ by 
using immigration as a scapegoat; laying blame for job losses, claiming that welfare and 
housing for immigrants hurt those Austrians in need, and that immigrants were a source 
of crime.7 Haider goes as far to accuse the SPÖ of attempting to silence critics by 
accusing opponents of immigration of being “fascists” and attempting to use immigrants 
as a “new proletariat” in class warfare.8 At the same time, it appealed to former ÖVP-
conservative voters by attacking the SPÖ and “extreme leftists” for encouraging 
multiculturalism and welfare culture; an appeal to the authoritarian right. Arguably, with 
the lack of security about jobs and welfare, it is understandable that entitlement to what 
is now believed to be scarce is up for question. What the FPÖ was able to do was to 
                                                
6 Herbert Kitschelt (2000), ‘Citizens, Politicians, and Party Cartellization: Political Representation and State 
Failure in Post-Industrial Democracies’, in European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 37, p. 161. 
7 Jörg Haider (1995) The Freedom I Mean, Swan Books, Pine Plains, New York, pp. 34-36.   
8 Ibid, pp. 32-33.  
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successfully target insecurities and attribute blame, whether from ‘lazy’ welfare recipients 
or immigrants.  
 
          Secondly, in an attempt to capture a broad range of social authoritarian spaces, the 
FPÖ focused on tradition and stability in times of insecurity. Piero Ignazi describes this 
appeal as neo-conservatism: opposition to welfare collectivism and more individual 
responsibility (for self employed) as well as nostalgia for an imagined, conservative past 
as opposed to post-materialist liberalism (both).9 Ignazi proposes that far-right issues 
such as traditional values, law and order, or even xenophobia (immigration) are the 
reaction of the far right to the post-materialist left; almost an answer or response to the 
challenge of social liberalism for a lack of values.10 Haider and the FPÖ focused strongly 
on a nostalgic, neo-conservative view of the past, reflected in this criticism from Haider 
about work ethics and the breakdown of society: 
“…once puritanical abstinence and the Protestant ethic were effective correctives to excessive consumption. 
Work had no negative connotations and was seen as the fulfilment of professional duty to make a 
contribution to the common good. This has given way to a plastic credit card society in which no-one 
thinks any more about what they could do for others”.11 
A more neo-conservative approach of a nostalgic past with solutions of individual work 
ethic backed up by traditional structures and values is a viable target for the socially 
conservative industrial voters whom SPÖ and ÖVP have left without a ‘natural’ party to 
support.  
 
        It can therefore be argued that because the SPÖ and ÖVP abandoned appeals to 
the old electorate spaces, the ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation were open for FPÖ 
                                                
9 Piero Ignazi (1992) ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-
Wing Parties in Europe’, in European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 22, pp. 18-19, 23.  
10 Ibid, p. 19, 24.  
11 Melanie A. Sully (1997) The Haider Phenomenon, East European Monographs, New York, p. 57. 
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appeals. The FPÖ focused on social authoritarian appeals to the bases of the old left and 
old right through the framing of threats and a neo-conservative appeal to values. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.3: The FPÖ and the Appeal to the ‘Winners’ of Post-Industrialisation  
 
            Although the ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation were disproportionately important 
to the FPÖ, in 1999 white collar voters made up 26% of those who voted FPÖ and 
overall 21% of white collar voters voted FPÖ.12 This is a curious contrast to the ‘losers’ 
of post-industrialisation because the ‘winners’ did well, yet, for different reasons many 
voted for the FPÖ as many ‘losers’ did. It must be remembered that the white collar 
voters tended towards the ÖVP through the ÖAAB in the Chambers of Labour, but 
subsequently were enticed by the SPÖ under Bruno Kreisky, but then appeared from 
1986 onwards to be volatile, though eventually still leaning towards the SPÖ. Both 
parties lost significant amounts of white collar support despite their attempts to target 
white collar voters. Although the SPÖ still held a large plurality, the ÖVP was worst 
affected, which is significant insofar as the FPÖ appears to be the direct recipient.  
 
           The main reason that the ‘winners’ of post-industrialisation were a politically free 
space was that they were not within the auxiliary networks of the Lager. The younger 
generations, being those of 18-30 and 31-44, were better educated, in a better 
employment position, more likely to work in the private sector so outside of public 
sector patronage and auxiliary networks; they were therefore less targeted as potential 
voters by the Lagerparteien.13 These groups being outside Lager sub-cultural networks 
lessened the abilities of Lagerparteien to indoctrinate them, with white collar employees 
                                                
12 Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und 
Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 28.  
13 Gerlich (1992) ‘A Farewell to Corporatism’, pp. 139-140. 
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participating less in chamber elections, employer organisations or the ÖGB.14 With less 
Lager penetration into working lives, the FPÖ had an opportunity to target free political 
spaces.  
 
         Firstly, the FPÖ targeted white collar voters through attacking the networks of 
Proporz by highlighting and campaigning on resentment of privilege. Kitschelt claims of 
the far-right:“Faced with a patronage-driven, clientalist traditional party establishment, many educated 
white-collar professionals will also be cynical about the established parties and sense a desire to ‘teach 
them a lesson’.15 Because of the decline in the public sector and the rise of the private 
sector, natural Lager white collar bases such as employees in particular ministries 
controlled by a particular Lagerpartei declined. During the period of grand coalition 
government from 1987-2000, SPÖ and ÖVP appeals to public sector workers were 
stronger because of the continuance of public sector patronage and Lager networks, 
while appearing to neglect private sector employees.16 This created an opportunity for 
the FPÖ to target white collar private sector workers in particular by focusing on 
possible resentment towards Proporz. Haider claimed: “We want to get rid of the corporate 
elements in this system and abolish privilege and corruption… We do not want to descend to the level of 
the old parties which cannot tolerate new ideas… They need the great (grand) coalition, since it is only 
with public funds that they can fatten up the party machines of their loyal hacks”.17  
 
        During the 1990’s, the FPÖ campaigned on the founding of a “Third Republic” 
based on an end to corporatism and Proporz, and enacting populist decision-making 
                                                
14 Ibid, pp. 139-142.  
15 Kitschelt (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe, p. 21.  
16 Luther (2007) ‘Must What Goes Up Always Come Down?’ p. 69.  
Civil services and government sector leaned towards the governing parties because of party control over 
certain ministries: meaning benefits for those Lager patrons under those ministries, and patronage 
appointments.  
17 Haider (1995) The Freedom I Mean, p. 60. 
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measures such as a strong presidency, and a Swiss-based model of ‘plebiscitary 
democracy’ with important decisions being put to a national vote.18 The perception 
created was to create democratic accountability in contrast to Lagerparteien and thus target 
white collar voters disillusioned with the system. This would have worked with a broad 
range of white collar political spaces.  
 
           Private sector employee voting habits in 1999 reveal the success of the FPÖ. 
Although the SPÖ dominated with 36% of the vote, and the ÖVP still had 19% of the 
vote, the FPÖ had 31% of the vote.19 The FPÖ was clearly successful in its attempt to 
target white collar private sector voters. 
 
           Secondly, more specifically, the FPÖ positioned itself to the economic right of 
the ÖVP, effectively squeezing the ÖVP between the SPÖ and FPÖ by targeting ‘pro-
market’ voters. The FPÖ made a strong emphasis on classical liberalism, freedom of the 
individual and of entrepreneurship, with the state as a moderator that could maintain 
conditions for individual freedom.20 The ÖVP failed to develop and articulate alternative 
policies to the reformist market model of Vranitzky and Klima or a more neo-liberal 
alternative along the lines of most conservative parties in the western world.21 The SPÖ-
led reforms of Chancellor Franz Vranitsky reflected SPÖ initiative, while the ÖVP was 
too close to the SPÖ, thus leaving open a space to the economic right of those who 
wanted more neo-liberal economic reforms.22 The FPÖ advocated pro-market policies 
such as privatisation of some state companies, tax cuts, cutting bureaucracy, targeting 
                                                
18 Sully (1997) The Haider Phenomenon, pp. 24-27.  
19 Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und 
Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 33.  
20 Betz (1994) Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe, pp. 112-114.  
21 This will be discussed in-depth in Chapter Four. 
22 Lauber (1992) ‘Changing Priorities in Austrian Economic Policy’ pp. 156-160. 
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welfare cheats and rewarding hard work, and cutting ‘excessive’ welfare services.23 
Notable are Haider’s attacks against welfare. “Hard work must pay off. But the collectivist 
welfare state rewards all, irrespective of performance, in the same measure. The ‘achievers’ are in effect 
penalised and the bone idle rewarded... We must have the courage to remunerate those willing to work 
and contribute. This will make it unattractive for passive fellow travellers to abuse the system”.24  
 
           While SPO white collar support fell from 56% in 1986 to 36% in 1999, this was 
still a strong plurality; while ÖVP white collar votes fell from 36% to 23%, compared to 
the FPÖ from 13% to 22%25. While the ‘left’ vote was able to still stay relatively strong 
but unsplintered with a combined SPÖ-Grünen vote of 40.15% in 1999, the ‘right’ 
ÖVP-FPÖ vote, combined at 53.82%, was split. This reflects the fight for conservative 
voters between the ÖVP and FPÖ; with a strong tendency towards a centre-right 
squeeze. 
 
        To sum up, the FPÖ attracted significant numbers of white collar ‘winners’ of post-
industrialisation due to appeals directed at populist political reform measures and by 
positioning itself to the right of the ÖVP. Due to anger at the system for various reason, 
they could be attracted through messages from the FPÖ that took advantage at anger 
towards the system and turned it into a protest movement.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Haider (1995) The Freedom I Mean, pp. 53-55, 98-100.  
24 Sully (1997) The Haider Phenomenon, p. 58 
25 Plasser, Ulram and. Muller (1995), Wahlerverhalten und Parteienwettbewerg: Analysen zur Nationalratswahl, 
Signum Verlag, in Givens (2005), Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 56, 65. 
25 Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und 
Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 21. 
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Chapter 3.4: Grünen, LIF and the ‘Ideological Ghetto’  
 
           What about Grünen and LIF, who received 7.1% and 3.6% of the vote in 1999 
respectively? Why was it that they were not able to gain from discontent with 
Lagerparteien, considering that they were post-industrial political parties that also could 
have appealed to discontent with major parties? The contention here is that the Grünen 
and LIF represented post-industrial ideological niches rather than being broad based 
enough to appeal to both the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation.  
 
          Green parties, tending towards the libertarian left, demand post-materialist reform 
but apply socially liberal and economically left redistributionist solutions that many white 
collar voters would not subscribe; thus do not tend to appeal beyond a libertarian left 
political space. Grünen structure and policies would indicate that is a young, white collar, 
post-industrial party. Surveys from 1999 show that Grünen, with 7.1% of the vote, were 
strongest among white collar (10%), civil servants (12%), women (9%), under 30s (13%), 
public sector (9%), and students (20%).26 In contrast, they did poorly among traditional 
industrial class voters, including skilled blue collar (3%), unskilled blue collar (1%), 
farmers (2%), pensioners (1%), male (5%) and people 45-59, 60-69, and 70 and older (5, 
1, and 2% respectively).27 Grünen had to compete with the SPÖ for economic left voters 
but could not appeal to socially conservative blue collar voters. Issues such as the 
environment and gender equality may not appeal strongly outside white collar, 
libertarian-left spaces; thus excluding social authoritarian and economic right spaces.  
 
          Meanwhile, the LIF could not achieve a cross-society coalition because, again, they 
appeal to a certain section of white collar workers with socially liberal views, so did not 
                                                
26 Ibid, p. 21. 
27 Ibid, p. 21. 
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appeal to those to the libertarian left who tended to vote SPÖ and Grünen, or more 
socially authoritarian views like those who voted for the ÖVP or FPÖ.  The LIF, which 
gained 3.4% of the vote in 1999, was strongest among self employed and free 
professionals (8%), white collar (5%), students (10%), women (4%) and across age 
groups (4% across 18-59 groups).28 They did poorly with people aged 60-69 and 70+ (2 
and 0% respectively), blue collar workers (1%), farmers (0%), male (3%), and pensioners 
(1%).29 Like the Grünen, the LIF did well with younger, well educated, post-industrial 
workforce, but poorly among older, industrial class voters. Meanwhile, like Grünen, LIF 
had to contend with more pro-market positioned rivals: between the ÖVP on the 
pragmatic side and the FPÖ on the more pro-market end. LIF share of the vote fell 
from 6% in 1994 to 3.65% in 1999, signifying that like the ÖVP being squeezed between 
left and right, LIF was squeezed between pragmatic market and ‘pro-market’.  
 
       This would suggest that Grünen and LIF were positioning themselves on white collar 
concerns, yet competed on different ends of the post-industrial divide and also compete 
against larger parties. Grünen had to compete with the SPÖ on social issues while LIF 
had to compete with the FPÖ and ÖVP on economics, suggesting cannibalisation. Both 
Grünen and LIF could not extend beyond their niche, post-industrial appeals, so they 
could not build the cross-societal alliance that the FPÖ was able to do.  
 
 
 
Chapter 3.5: The FPÖ and the Cross-Societal Coalition 
 
          This subchapter will focus on the tactical appeals of the FPÖ that explain how it 
was able to attract this cross-class alliance of voters behind it from the 1980s onwards. 
                                                
28 Ibid, p. 21. 
29 Ibid, p. 21. 
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Consider this information from 1999 comparing the voter bases of the FPÖ to Grünen 
and LIF.  
 
 
Table 3.1: Party Voter Support Bases by Occupation and Education (Percentage), 
1999 
 
Categories  FPÖ Grünen LIF 
Occupation 
 
Self Employed-Free 
Professionals 
 
Civil Servants 
 
White Collar 
 
Blue Collar 
 
Pensioners 
 
Total 
 
 
10 
 
 
7 
 
26 
 
27 
 
18 
 
100 
 
 
8 
 
 
16 
 
46 
 
5 
 
3 
 
100 
 
 
19 
 
 
9 
 
43 
 
4 
 
6 
 
100 
Education 
 
Primary 
 
Secondary 
 
Tertiary 
 
Total 
 
 
16 
 
55 
 
30 
 
100 
 
 
3 
 
29 
 
68 
 
100 
 
 
3 
 
24 
 
73 
 
100 
 
Source: Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: 
Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 28. 
 
         Compared to the potential alternatives, it is clear that the FPÖ was able to do what 
Grünen and LIF could not do: build a party with support that spanned both the industrial 
classes and white collar voters. This reflects the ability to engage in strategy and message 
that can appeal to more voters than a typically post-industrial party. What united this 
cross-societal alliance was that the FPÖ appealed to both insecurity of the ‘losers’ and 
discontent of the ‘winners’. This combination of issues was capitalised by the FPÖ by it 
appealing to populist, protest instincts in portraying itself as an outsider party.    
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          The appeal of the FPÖ as a protest party for young, disillusioned voters was an 
appealing tactic in a society where politics were dysfunctional. The right is arguably a 
powerful vehicle for post-industrial populism, previously more left-wing and class based, 
because of new definitions of elitism. Taggart defines this ‘new-populism’ as an approach 
that “fuses the anti-politics stance of the New Politics with the broad based protest of the populist 
right”.30 He defines new-populist parties to combine populism, namely a ‘silent majority’ 
(us) against an indifferent or threatening ‘them’ (those in government, liberal and cultural 
elites; indifferent to ‘welfare cheats’ and immigrants). This has been particularly 
successful from the 1990s onward, associated with centre-right parties such as the 
Republican Party in the USA under George W. Bush from 2000 onward, and the Law 
and Justice Party of Poland under the Kaczyński brothers from 2001. It can be 
successful because the post-industrial environment allows new-populists to redefine the 
‘us’ versus ‘them’ beyond class in order to frame in order to suit its own views on issues; 
namely political culture, welfare, government and immigration; therefore succeeding 
where post-war, neo-fascist far-right parties failed.31  
 
        The new-populist appeal of the FPÖ was a major factor in creating that cross-
societal alliance. In any case, significant numbers from both occupational groups wanted 
to, as Kitschelt described, to “teach them a lesson”. An exit poll of FPÖ voters in 1999 on 
reasons for their vote is revealing as an indicator of why people chose to vote for that 
party.  
 
 
                                                
30 Paul Taggart (1995) ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, in West European Politics, Vol. 18, No. 1, 
p. 35.  
31 Ibid, pp. 36-40.  
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Table 3.2: FPÖ Voters and Voting Reasons, 1999 
Reasons for Voting  
FPÖ  
FPÖ voters and 
floating voters 
FPÖ core supportersFPÖ soft supporters 
(swing voters) 
-Because the FPÖ would 
expose scandals and try  
them 
 
-Because the FPÖ would 
bring a fresh wind of  
change 
 
-Because they would 
represent my interests  
and for the sake of  
tradition 
 
-Because the FPÖ is  
against foreign migration 
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         63 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
47 
  68 
 
 
 
           65 
 
 
 
  55 
 
 
 
            
            52 
    65 
 
 
 
             62 
 
 
 
    37 
 
 
 
 
    39 
 
Source: Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends 
und Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 15. 
 
          This survey indicates that swing voters largely voted FPÖ as a means of protest 
and democratic renewal. Both hardcore and swing voters wanted to attack perceived 
corruption and renew the system. Swing voters were not overly enthusiastic about feeling 
that the FPÖ represented their interests, or the core FPÖ issue of immigration; this 
suggesting that immigration appeals, to many, were either more seen as another example 
of an indifferent government or that the issue was not that important. This suggests the 
FPÖ positioning itself as a protest party.  
 
          Within the new post-industrial political landscape the FPÖ used new-populist 
appeals to rally against Lagerparteien and ‘cultural elites’ while portraying themselves as the 
outsiders who aimed to begin anew with the “Third Republic”. Haider used broad based, 
culturally focused attacks on the political elites of Austria, focusing on government elites 
as being responsible for self interested, self sustaining, corrupt, selfishness that had 
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caused the breakdown of traditional values such as fairness and hard work; while the 
FPÖ would end Proporz and institute a system based on hard work and fairness.32 
Haider’s attack on the ‘bankrupt ’68 generation’, an attack on liberal elites, sent a clear 
message: “The revolutionary spirit dried out in the sun-baked vineyards of Tuscany …they are 
‘conservative’ in so far as they stand for their own naked power claims and the preservation of their own 
influence. They are no longer bothered about a better world or a just society but only with keeping their 
jobs and positions”.33 The intention of this was to criticise the political elites, more so the 
SPÖ. Haider’s rhetoric more often has singled out ‘Socialists’ and ‘Marxists’ and more or 
less portrayed Lagerparteien as one ‘left’, ‘elitist’ bloc.  By portraying them as wealthy, self 
interested elites, the FPÖ was able to harness anger against perceived privilege.  
 
        Furthermore, the FPÖ attacked what it perceived as the liberal excesses in Austrian 
society by attacking the ‘wrong’ kind of culture that attacked Austria. Haider relentlessly 
targeted playwrights, authors and artists as ‘left wing intelligensia’ who attacked Austrian 
participation in World War Two, whose production and works were perceived to be 
‘sexual perversion’, or attacked anything perceived as liberal excess and therefore ‘anti-
Austrian’.34 ‘New left intellectuals’, ‘feminists’ and ‘political correctness’ were targeted by 
the FPÖ, which positioned itself as defending a ‘silent majority’ against the erosion of 
traditional values.35 Contrasting himself to the elites, the FPÖ under Haider was 
portrayed as being able to appeal to the ‘man on the street’. From this, the FPO 
campaigned for the votes of these ‘decent’ people, against the “’68-vintage pseudo-left 
Viennese intellectuals” who knew nothing of the ordinary people.36  
                                                
32 Sully (1997) The Haider Phenomenon, pp. 21-29, 57-60.  
33 Haider (1995) The Freedom I Mean, p. 17. 
34 Andre Gingrich (2002) ‘A Man For All Seasons: An Anthropological Perspective on Public 
Representation and Cultural Politics of the Austrian Freedom Party’, in Ruth Wodak and Anton Pelinka, 
The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, Transation Publishers, New Jersey, pp. 82-84. 
35 Sully (1997) The Haider Phenomenon, pp. 57-59.  
36 Ibid, pp. 35-37, 57-60.  
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         Social issues, namely immigration and welfare entitlement is another example of 
new-populism and have been important to tap discontent as part of a greater theme of 
anger at the system and therefore garnering protest votes.37 The FPÖ used the frame of 
‘us’ and ‘them’ to portray threats to Austrian livelihood and safety; namely immigration 
and perceived consequences. “…it is not the immigrants who integrate into the society and culture 
they find themselves in, instead they expect from nations that they should accept their customs. Peaceful 
integration is not likely”.38 Examples from the 1999 election campaign include the slogan 
“Stop Foreign Infiltration”, a caricature of African immigrants as wealthy criminals with 
“designer suits and mobile phones”, and the claim of top list candidate Thomas Prinzhorn of 
“free hormone treatments from the Social Welfare Office” as a conspiracy to increase their 
numbers.39 Again, Haider created another ‘them’ who are not ‘us’, namely immigrants, by 
using a broad stereotype of all immigrants as a threat against ‘us’. The FPÖ combined 
this threat with government inaction and even claims of support for such ‘others’. “Most 
of the leftist ideologues seem to have a hatred of their own people. “Austrians stink and steal” was the 
title of a brochure of the Austrian Socialist Youth, calling for an open immigration policy. They think 
they have found in foreigners a new “proletariat” to be engaged in a new kind of class warfare. Whoever 
is against unrestricted immigration…is a ‘racist’, a ‘fascist’, a Nazi or at best ‘xenophobic’ ”.40  
 
        The combination of framing of perceived threats with government indifference 
combined fear with anger in order to mobilise protest support behind the FPÖ.  
 
                                                
37 Taggart (1995), ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, pp. 40, 47.  
38 Sully (1997) The Haider Phenomenon, p. 58. 
39 Ruth Wodak (2002) ‘Discourse and Politics: The Rhetoric of Exclusion’, in Wodak and Pelinka, The 
Haider Phenomenon in Austria, p. 36.  
40 Haider (1995) The Freedom I Mean, p. 60. 
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         What also must be considered was the affect of right wing new populism upon the 
ÖVP. It has already been highlighted that the ÖVP was squeezed between the SPÖ and 
FPÖ due to it being sidelined between ‘left’ and ‘right’ poles. Given Haider’s attacks 
focusing on a ‘Socialist’, ‘Marxist’ left, the ÖVP was trapped in the middle or saddled 
with the left. The ÖVP did not fit neatly because it was squeezed economically and 
socially between the poles of left and right. An example of this was the debate over the 
Nazi legacy in Austria that took place in the 1980s and 1990s.41 Though it could be 
argued that the ÖVP defence against accusations of against Kurt Waldheim’s Nazi past 
were questionable, FPÖ defence of Austrian participation in the Wehrmacht and SS, and 
downplaying war atrocities was more in line with defending the status quo that was 
agreed upon by the SPÖ and ÖVP after World War Two.42 The SPÖ gradually came to 
represent, at least in part, the contrition side, the FPÖ defending the status quo, and the 
ÖVP defending but squeezed between the two. This provides another example of the 
SPÖ and the FPÖ taking either side, while the ÖVP was squeezed.   
 
         What can be ascertained in spite of who the target was, whether immigrant, 
cultural elites, or people on welfare, is that the FPÖ used new-populist appeals to garner 
protest votes from all sides. The FPÖ created archetypes of an ‘un-Austrian’, ‘elitist’ 
‘them’ pitted against the ‘honest’, ‘hard working’, ‘native’ ‘us’ in order to garner protest 
votes.43 The governing parties, namely the SPÖ as senior governing partner, was 
portrayed as uncaring or even encouraging of threats to Austria, while the ÖVP was 
squeezed by the two other parties due to the FPÖ positioning itself to the authoritarian 
right of the ÖVP.   
                                                
41 David Art (2006) The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, pp. 110-111. 
42 Wodak (2002) ‘Discourse and Politics: The Rhetoric of Exclusion’, pp. 37-38. 
43 Reinhold Gartner (2002) ‘The FPO, Foreigners, and Racism in the Haider Era’, in Wodak and Pelinka, 
The Haider Phenomenon in Austria,  p 23. 
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Chapter 3.6: Post-Industrial Organisational Advantages of the FPÖ 
 
 
         What must also not be forgotten as a factor in FPÖ success in occupying political 
spaces was the clear party organisational advantage that it had over both major parties.  
 
        The FPÖ had a simple advantage in that it was a post-industrial party that was 
beholden to no real tradition, no encompassing base in society, no strong ties to strong 
economic interest groups, and no strong auxiliary networks; therefore allowing for a 
manoeuvrable organisation. The SPÖ and ÖVP, as class-mass parties with industrial 
interest-group-based organisational structures, had to rely in auxiliary groups and elites 
for permission for policy approval; making changes time consuming. This table reveals 
voter density in parties in Austria during elections (voter density being members as a 
percentage of voters). 
          
Table 3.3: Voter Density (Membership vs Votes), 1971-1990 
                  SPÖ                                   ÖVP                                            FPÖ                                                
Year Members Voters Density
(%) 
Members* 
 
Voters Density
 (%) **
Members 
 
Voters Density
 (%) 
1971 719,389 2,280,168 32.4 805,771 1,964,713 31 -----*** 248,473 11.3 
 
1979 721,262 2,413,226 29.9 813,715 1,981,739 30 37,288 286,743 13.0 
1986 674,821 2,092,024 32.3 806,331 2,003,663 26 36,583 472,205 7.8 
1990 620,141 2,012,787 31.7 813,331 1,460,392 35 40,629 754,379 5.4 
   
Source: Kurt Richard Luther (1992) ‘Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System’, in West 
European Politics, Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 49. 
 
* ÖVP figures distorted because of members are counted as they belong to for all three 
leagues separately, as well as family membership. 
** Overall estimate for ÖVP 
*** Estimate for FPÖ for 1971 
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        Both SPÖ and ÖVP can be said to have relied upon about 30% of their votes from 
party members. The FPÖ never relied on a strong base, but this did not matter because 
it could target both the newly released ‘losers’ as well as the free space of ‘winners’. FPÖ 
organisation was cheaper to run and left more money for advertising, and was more able 
to change policy and direction than the other parties who had to consult mass 
membership and affiliated interest groups.44 The focus on Haider allowed the party not 
only to bypass grassroots members to create clearer policies that can be arguably easier 
to sell, but also focus on the leader is arguably a simpler way to market a party in order 
to maximise impact on the constituency because the leaders ‘qualities’ become associated 
with the party.45 The FPÖ was freer to decide strategy, in which they could appeal to 
groups as far apart as voters to the economic right and former SPÖ Lager voters. 
 
           Modern media techniques also gave an advantage to the FPÖ because it helped 
focus a finely tuned message to appeal across constituencies. The FPÖ utilised a mix of 
good communications through PR firm’s creative branding of the FPÖ and Haider, 
gimmicks such as celebrity candidates, used media formats of debates against the main 
parties by having Haider as an equal to SPÖ and ÖVP leaders, and most importantly, 
making Haider the centre of political campaigning.46 Given the broad base, Haider could 
appeal as many things to many people by manipulating the media perceptions of him to 
create a universal, appealing perception. Haider could appeal to blue collar working class 
and rural voters through attending folk culture festivals, wearing lederhosen and using a 
                                                
44 Wolfgang C. Müller, Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram (2004) ‘Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter 
Loyalties in Austria: Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap’, in Mair, P, Müller, W.C and 
Plasser, F (eds), Political Parties and Electoral Change, SAGE Publications, London, pp. 154, 157-158.  
45 Taggart (1995) ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, pp. 40-42.  
46 Muller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) ‘Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria’, pp. 154, 
158, 165-168.  
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simplified dialect of German, to the white collar young through expensive dress sense to 
show sophistication on the one hand and casual for press conferences on the other.47  
 
          All of this shows a deliberate campaign to appeal to all people through use media 
strategies to target a broad, volatile audience. The FPÖ, through Haider, used anger 
against the system as an outside third party to promote an image of Haider as a rebel 
outsider against the excesses of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘political elitism’ and a defender of 
traditional Austrian culture. They could be all things to all people.  
 
Conclusion 
 
          The FPÖ was successful in appealing to a significant cross-section of the Austrian 
electorate as a result of populist campaigning that targeted both the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ 
of post-industrialisation. Theoretical shifts towards post-industrialisation applied in 
Austria, but due to factors of Proporz and party organisational structure, Lagerparteien were 
closer together, leaving spaces open for social authoritarian and economic right voters.  
Because of grand coalition government, Proporz and attempts at targeting white collar 
votes, the SPÖ and ÖVP abandoned their respective appeals to traditional left and right 
spaces respectively, yet also left spaces open to the FPÖ. The FPÖ appealed to the 
‘losers’ of post-industrialisation by framing insecurities like immigration as a threat to 
previously guaranteed jobs, housing and welfare payments, and representing itself as  a 
neo-conservative party that would return order and tradition in an insecure, modern 
world. The FPÖ appealed to the ‘winners’ of post-industrialisation by targeting white 
collar voters by targeting conservative spaces through appealing on the basis of anti-
Proporz appeals and campaigning to the economic right of the ÖVP. This squeezed the 
                                                
47 Gingrich (2002) ‘A Man for All Seasons’, pp. 73-80.  
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ÖVP between the SPÖ and FPÖ, leading to FPÖ gains largely at the expense of the 
ÖVP. The Grünen and LIF, being strictly post-industrial parties with ideological 
concerns, were unable to appeal beyond niche ideological white collar voters.  
 
         The FPÖ united both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ by using a new-populist message that 
framed a clearly defined ‘us’ against an uncaring, cultural and governmental elitist, and 
outsider them (immigrants, government). The FPÖ positioned itself as the guardian of 
‘us’ against the privileged excesses of ‘them’. Being a post industrial party with 
organisational flexibilities and no loyalties to the status quo, the FPÖ was able to use 
media and organisational techniques to skilfully position itself and appeal to wide cross-
sections of society by being something different to each group; whether pro-market tax 
reformers to the right of the ÖVP or as defenders of welfare and education from 
immigrants to target former SPÖ voters.  
 
           In conclusion, FPÖ new-populism successfully targeted open political spaces to 
establish a cross-societal coalition of voters. However, the successes of the FPÖ would 
not have been as pronounced without the failures of the Lagerparteien. Surely, the SPÖ 
and ÖVP must have realised what was happening and knew that in order to sustain their 
votes, they would have needed to change policies, appeals and approaches. Why did they 
both fail to change? As discussed in the next chapter, the crux of this thesis, party 
organisational structure matters.  
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Chapter Four: Why Did the SPÖ and ÖVP Fail to Adapt to 
Post-Industrial Environmental Challenges?  
  
 
            The previous chapter explained how the FPÖ used cross-societal appeals to 
empty political spaces to gain at the expense of the major parties. Yet this does not 
explain why the FPÖ was so successful within the context of the main parties’ actions 
and responses. Surely, SPÖ and ÖVP leadership anticipated the new political 
environment of the 1980s, which there is ample evidence that they did, and would have 
concluded that in order to survive, they would have adapt their strategies, tactics and 
appeal to meet new challenges. ÖVP support had been falling gradually since 1970. The 
SPÖ began promisingly enough, winning a plurality of votes in every general election 
from 1970 until 2002. But, its share of the vote began to decline after 1983, rising only in 
1995. 
 
            Unlike in most western European societies, the SPÖ and ÖVP failed where 
others have succeeded, evident in their decline from 1986-1999, suggesting that 
something within these parties was preventing them from changing policies and 
approaches that were incompatible with a post-industrial environment. Previous chapters 
highlighted Lagermentalitat and Proporz as an incentive to continue consociational 
governance. Parties served in defending their ideological interests, embedded interest 
group interests, and as a dispenser of Lager patronage. As suggested, support for 
Lagerparteien was undermined by two factors. Firstly, by the decline of Lager 
constituencies and their replacement by white collar voters outside of auxiliary networks, 
and secondly, by the inability to protect traditional industrial bases from post-industrial 
economic forces sacrificed the role as ‘gatekeeper’. These both allowed for the FPÖ to 
claim votes from across all political spaces, however, this begs the question: why didn’t 
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the Lagerparteien fight back? The answer is that internal organisational structures within 
both parties prevented leadership from making necessary changes to policy and action; 
severely limiting their abilities to reach out to new voters.      
 
            Certain factors must be taken into account when asking why the SPÖ and ÖVP 
failed to adapt. Firstly, both parties had different experiences with governance, with the 
SPÖ ruling without the ÖVP from 1970 to 1987, and the ÖVP not having a Chancellor 
from 1970 until 2000. This provided different incentives and disincentives. Secondly, the 
relative decline of the parties’ traditional Lager also varies with regard to whose decline 
was most dramatic. The rural, self-employed and Catholic ÖVP base declined faster than 
the SPÖ electorate, while the SPÖ initially gained significant support from the white 
collar voters during the 1970s. Taking this into account, there are three subchapters. The 
first subchapter will be a discussion of flaws in orthodox theory that leads to a broad 
outline of why both parties failed to adapt. The second and third subchapters must 
investigate reasons unique to each party as to why they failed to adapt.  
 
 
Chapter 4.1: Orthodox Party Theory, Cartelism and the Failure of Transformation 
from an Industrial to Post- Industrial Party System in Austria 
 
 
 
          The failures of both the SPÖ and ÖVP to adapt must be analysed within the 
context of orthodox theory on party transformation and its flaws in order to argue an 
alternative theory.  
 
           The main structural orthodox theory of party transformation, Otto Kircheimer’s 
‘catch-all’ theory, will be accepted as the framework, but also reveals major flaws in 
orthodox thinking. Kircheimer argues that parties will inevitably transform from an 
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industrial, ‘class-mass’ party model towards a catch-all party model because it is better 
suited to deal with post-industrial environments, being reformist, socially mobile, and 
based more on social issues.1 Parties should become more centralised and less doctrinaire 
in order for leaders to make appeals beyond traditional industrial bases to reach out to 
service sector-based, white collar voters.2  
 
         The major critique of orthodox theory on party transformation is the inadequacy in 
assuming that parties are rational bodies that are capable of responding to changing 
environments by simply changing tactics and policy. If it were that simple, then 
leadership, realising the inevitability of decline if there was no change, would change 
policies in order to broaden appeals. Strom argues against this, claming that orthodox 
theory treats parties as singular actors, rather than factoring in the constraints of party 
organisation from forces and institutions inside and outside the party.3 In other words, 
parties and their leaders cannot be uniform bodies that aim always to win or for 
maximum influence, nor are they universally able to change, policy and tactics to suit 
aims.  
 
           The Austrian case study makes a powerful case for the consideration of internal 
party constraints as opposed to assuming that external factors of changing environments 
will force parties to act rationally. Party leadership in Austria realised that their parties 
needed to change and adapt, especially after reversals from 1986 onwards, but were 
undermined by their organisations. This is evident in the re-establishment of grand 
coalition government from 1987-1999 despite its increasing unsuitability in post-
                                                
1 Kircheimer (1966) ‘The Transformation of Western European Party Systems’, pp. 182-193 
2 Ibid, pp. 190-191.  
3 Kaare Strom (1990) ‘A Behavioural Theory of Competitive Political Parties, in American Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 569-570.  
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industrial Austria.4 Corporatist groups used their influence within their parties in order to 
maximise their influence as corporatist negotiators; best in grand coalition government, 
just as during the 1945-1966 period of coalition government. Katz and Mair are correct 
in detailing cartel model theory, claiming that mutual survival as a feature exists in order 
to maintain influence for themselves and as a group.5 However, despite their intent, 
cartelism cannot be a party model. Instead, cartel tactics are used in order to ensure 
mutual benefit; this is reflected in political outcomes such as government formation and 
parliamentary votes that excluded other parties and interests.6  
 
            Therefore, the argument is that orthodox party transformation theory is 
inadequate because internal constrains imposed by interest group-based structures 
prevented party leadership from acting rationally, thus preventing Lagerparteien from 
broadening their support.  
 
Chapter 4.2: The SPÖ: Promising Start, Poor Finish 
 
            The SPÖ was the one of the two main parties that fared better. Though it won a 
plurality of the votes and provided a Chancellor from 1970-1999, it was unable to halt an 
almost constant electoral decline in support since 1983 and fell to a low of 33.15% in 
1999. There is ample evidence that forces within internal party organisation, namely the 
ÖGB, used its position to undermine attempts at adaptation and reaching out to new 
voters.  
                                                
4 Luther (2007) ‘Must What Goes Up Always Come Down?’ pp. 64-67.  
5 Peter Mair and Richard S. Katz (1997) ‘Party Organisation, Party Democracy and the Emergence 
of the Cartel Party’, in Peter Mair (ed), Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, pp. 109-114.  
6 Luther (2007) ‘A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties in Consociational 
Democracy’, p. 12.  
Interestingly, this tactic has existed in countries which experienced strong anti-statist, populist 
parties that attacked cartel tactics; including the List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, Lega Nord in 
Italy and the FPÖ in Austria. 
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            The SPÖ was in a difficult position because of the decline of the Socialist Lager 
since the beginning of the Second Republic. Firstly, the SPÖ could not continue to rely 
on a shrinking part of the electorate. By 1999 blue collar workers made up only 15% the 
electorate and 16% of the SPÖ voters.7 Secondly, SPÖ membership fell dramatically in 
number as a proportion of the electorate from a high of 721,737 (15% of electorate) in 
1959 to 522,000 (9%) in 1995, reducing the potential reliable turnout in elections.8 
Thirdly, the base membership of the party was still largely unrepresentative of the 
electorate as a whole because it overrepresented blue collar workers. In 1989 the rank 
and file was 47.3% blue collar compared to 25.6% civil servants and 24.4% white collar.9 
The SPÖ was in danger of appealing to a shrinking part of an electorate that no longer 
supported it with such past fervour and could no longer guarantee it significant numbers 
of votes.   
 
              Observing the transition period that began in the 1960s it is evident that SPÖ 
leadership understood the changing socioeconomic situation and did try to become a 
catch-all party. The election of Bruno Kreisky to the post of Chairman of the SPÖ in 
1967 is a good indicator of the beginnings of attempted transformation; given the loss of 
the 1966 election which led to a reformist, single-party majority ÖVP government. 
Defeating establishment candidate Hans Czettel (backed by former leader Bruno 
Pitterman, former Transport Minister Karl Waldbrunner, and ÖGB President Anton 
Benya) by appealing to the Länder party organisations, Kreisky attempted to transform 
the SPÖ into a “liberal People’s Party” and appealed successfully beyond the blue collar 
                                                
7 Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und 
Entscheidungsmotive’, pp. 11, 28. 
8 Kurt Richard Luther (1998) ‘From Accommodation to Competition: The ‘Normalisation’ of the Second 
Republic’s Party System’ in Kurt Richard Luther and Peter J. G. Pulzer (eds), Austria 1945-1995: Fifty Years 
of the Second Republic, Ashgate, Brookfield, Vermont, p. 127.  
9 Luther (1992) ‘Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System’, p. 56.  
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base to the growing numbers of university educated, white collar employees, youth and 
women.10 The SPÖ targeted white collar liberal voters; contrasted with the ÖVP, which 
was under socially reactionary pressure from the Catholic Church on issues such as 
abortion and gay rights, and therefore appeared less socially liberal.11 Kreisky 
disassociated the SPÖ from the perceptions of radicalism by emphasising himself as a 
“social democrat” and a “centrist”, and enacted a program of Austro-Keynesianism, high 
employment levels, reducing the period of compulsory military training, expanded 
educational provision, gender equality, and legal abortion and homosexuality.12  
 
          Clearly, the SPÖ and its more pragmatic stance intended on softening its image 
towards more of a catch-all party focus. Kreisky’s SPÖ reversed the ÖVP majority of 
1966 by winning the 1970 election, won a majority in 1971, with Kreisky as Chancellor 
from 1970 to 1983. The successes by 1986, three years after Kreisky stepped down as 
Chancellor, show that the SPÖ initially retained a monopoly on support of the more 
post-industrial segments of the electorate. 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Oliver Rathkolb (2002) ‘The Kreisky Era, 1970-1983’, in Rolf Steininger, Gunter Bischoff and Michael 
Gehler, Austria in the Twentieth Century, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, pp. 269-271.   
11 Ibid, p. 272.  
12 Ibid, pp. 274-286.  
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        Table 4.1: Austrian Party Voter Bases, 1986 General Election 
Voter  
Segments (%) 
SPO 1986 OVP 1986 FPO 1986 
Age 
18-30 
31-44 
 
39 
43 
 
33 
37 
 
12 
11 
Occupation 
White Collar 
 
57 
 
 
36 
 
13 
Gender 
Female 
 
43 
 
 
43 
 
7 
 
Total 
 
 
43.1 
 
41.3 
 
9.7 
 
Source: Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram and. Wolfgang C. Muller (1995), Wahlerverhalten und 
Parteienwettbewerg: Analysen zur Nationalratswahl, Signum Verlag, in Terri Givens, (2005), Voting 
Radical Right in Western Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 56, 65. 
 
 
       These election results reveal SPÖ appeal to the core new middle class segments. The 
SPÖ had a clear lead among younger to middle aged, especially white collar, and a strong 
base among female voters. Especially telling is the lead with these over the ÖVP. These 
results would suggest a future with a strong SPÖ and a weaker ÖVP. However, by 1999, 
though still ahead of the ÖVP on 26.9% and the FPÖ on 27.2%, SPÖ share of the vote 
fell to 33.4%. Considering the early successes of Kreisky’s appeal to the young, female, 
liberal, middle class, educated voters, the SPÖ knew these groups were the future voter 
pool. However, attempting to attract these voters clashed the structure of the SPÖ and 
Lagermentalitat of interests within that structure, which saw an ideological division 
between what could be deemed ‘post-industrial’ and ‘moderate’ approaches.  
 
          The leftist approach, advocated by younger members such Josef Cap and Heinz 
Fischer, was in favour of more responsive and accountable liberal socialist / libertarian 
left policies that advocated more redistribution, liberalised work hours, and a more 
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liberal social policy.13 This was more reflective of an understanding of quality of life 
issues as being important. They were clashed with party interests, evident in the 
‘Androsch affair’, where the Minister of Finance Hannes Androsch was attacked by the 
left as being too linked to business interests; and the willingness of the government to 
export arms to undemocratic regimes in South America.14 Cap was placed on the Vienna 
list in the 1983 general election and with 62,457 votes, and won the largest number of 
preference votes as a list candidate in Austria, campaigning on a grassroots, leftist, 
environmental platform that was popular.15 The leftist approach did have promise and 
followed a more post-industrial libertarian-left approach.     
 
          The pragmatists, led by Kreisky and included conservative forces such as ÖGB, 
especially under Anton Benya, extolled a softer, more universally encompassing message 
in order to bridge the gaps between the left and the old party base; especially the 
industrial workers. The conservative force of the ÖGB and other entrenched interests 
saw economics as of primary importance against ‘secondary’ social issues because both 
these projects would bring economic benefits to blue collar workers. It responded 
harshly to challenges; exemplified by the example from Chapter One of the expulsion of 
Josef Cap from the party executive for allegations of privilege against Theodor Kery. 
 
         Although the pragmatists attempted to bridge the gaps of industrial and post-
industrial, it was soon apparent that ÖGB structural power meant that both pragmatists 
and leftists were unable to properly challenge entrenched interests.  Despite attempts at 
                                                
13 Sully (1986) ‘Austrian Social Democracy’ pp. 157, 161-163, 167-169.  
14 Ibid, pp. 162-163, 167-168.  
15 Alfred Stirnemann (1989) ‘Recruitment and Recruitment Strategies’, in Anton Pelinka and Fritz Plasser 
(eds), The Austrian Party System, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, pp. 406-407. 
n.b/ Austrian Nationalrat members are elected on the basis of proportional representation lists within 43 
electoral districts in Austria. 
Also worth mentioning was that the second ranked candidate in Vienna to Josef Cap was ÖGB President 
Anton Beyna. This could be deemed significant as symbolic of the generational clash and an indicator of 
public preferences.  
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openness and change, Kreisky’s SPÖ still engaged in Proporz and corporatism. In the 
Nationalrat, despite holding a majority from 1970-1983, during the 1971-1975 and 1979-
1983 sessions, 84% and 75% of respective laws were passed with both SPÖ and ÖVP 
unanimous approval; a reflection that Nationalrat legislators were still open to corporatist 
and Lager lobbying.16 Especially notable was that the President of the Nationalrat during 
these times was Anton Benya. Also, the Joint Commission on Prices and Wages was just 
as influential under Kreisky as under the previous governments. Party structure and 
makeup was still restricted because it reflected ÖGB interests. In 1983 ÖGB members 
made up 75% of the party and 60% of all unionised employees.17 Until 1994, the head of 
the ÖGB was on every SPÖ delegation in coalition negotiations. It still had its 
representatives in post-election coalition committees and party leadership committee 
structures had not changed over time.18 Given the ÖGB emphasis on ‘industrial 
thinking’, they were not likely to accept left focus on left-libertarian ‘quality of life’ issues; 
they were less willing to adapt from ‘old left’ thinking. 
 
          No example could be more significant than the Zwentendorf referendum of 1978. 
This referendum was called by the SPÖ government in 1978 in order to open the newly 
constructed first nuclear reactor at Zwentendorf in Lower Austria, which was 
deadlocked in the Nationalrat due to ÖVP political manoeuvring and opposition within 
local and sectional SPÖ groups, namely the Sozialistische Jugend (Socialist Youth, SJ) under 
Cap, and a cross-section of liberals, greens and conservatives.19 Despite such opposition 
within and outside of the party, the corporatist interest groups, especially the ÖGB and 
                                                
16 Wolfgang C. Müller (1993) ‘Executive-Legislative Relations in Austria, 1945-1992’, in Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 481-485.  
17 Sully (1986) ‘Austrian Social Democracy’, p. 166. 
18 In 1994 and 1999, ÖGB delegations walked out of each SPÖ coalition committee delegation. This was 
largely symbolic against economic neoliberal policies; but still did not change ÖGB power and influence 
within the party.  
19 Anton Pelinka (1983) ‘The Nuclear Power Referendum in Austria’, in Electoral Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 
254-256. 
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the ÖIG (Association of Austrian Industrialists, close to the ÖVP), all agreed in favour 
of nuclear power. Benya, as Nationalrat member and President of the Nationalrat and the 
ÖGB at this time, used his influence to favour in Zwentendorf as a corporatist 
agreement and in favour of job creation.20  
 
           Zwentendorf united opposition from youth, green groups, and ultimately many 
liberal, white collar voters; whom the SPÖ had reached out to in the past and hope to 
continue with. The victory of the anti-nuclear vote by 50.5% to 49.5% was a defeat for 
the potential of the SPÖ to reach out to younger, more socially liberal, environmentally 
conscious ‘post-materialist’ voters. Polls showed that it was the white collar workers 
(31% to 34%) and professionals (45%-22%) who voted ‘no’; the demographic groups 
whom the SPÖ hoped to appeal to.21 It was from here that the Green movement in 
Austria began to gain traction, with the Alternative Liste Österreichs (ALÖ), the Vereinte 
Grüne Österreichs (VGÖ) forming each in 1982, were influenced heavily by Zwentendorf 
and united in 1986 to form Grünen and win 4.8% of the vote and representation in the 
Nationalrat.  
 
          Though it is doubtful that a green party would not have emerged, they were 
assisted by the SPÖ in its ÖGB ties, in which they were prevented from rethinking along 
the lines of a more post-industrial libertarian-left that the left faction supported. The 
ÖGB was still in a mindset of corporatism and conservative thinking, yet retained a 
position of disproportionate power within a party that aimed to appeal to white collar 
voters. Another prominent example was the support by the ÖGB of exporting arms to 
South American dictatorships during the 1980s, justified by the ÖGB as creating jobs 
                                                
20 Sully (1986) ‘Austrian Social Democracy’, pp. 158-159 
21 Pelinka (1983) ‘The Nuclear Referendum in Austria’, pp. 256-258.  
Those white collar and professional voters not included were those who claimed to have abstained from 
voting in the referendum. 
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and keeping with corporatist agreements, which was opposed by the SJ, and no doubt 
caused problems with liberal, white collar voters.22 Moves toward the introduction of a 
35 hour work week by the ÖGB official and Minister of Social Affairs during the 1980-
1983 government, Alfred Dallinger, were viewed with scepticism by the leadership, 
including Benya, delayed for introduction until the late 1980’s, and never enacted; largely 
because of the ÖVP coalition from 1987.23 One last example was the well meaning 
founding of the Ministry of Health and the Environment in 1972, under Minister Kurt 
Steyrer from 1981-1985, was argued to have been given insufficient power to implement 
policy that would have more effectively dealt with noise, air and water pollution from 
industry. 24 This was opposed by the ÖGB and would have been precisely the measures 
to appeal to liberal white collar voters.  
 
         After Kreisky, attempts at reform failed because of illegitimacy due to the 
continuation of Proporz, corporatism and grand coalition government. For a while, 
economic liberalisation, spearheaded after 1986 by Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, looked 
promising. Vranitzky, a former director of several large Austrian banks, was seen as a 
clean, reforming moderniser. The 1990 election campaign in Austria resulted in the SPÖ 
achieving a large plurality of 42.8% to the ÖVP on 32.1%, largely due to campaigning on 
Vranitzky’s image as a tough reformist outsider and with less emphasis on the SPÖ; 
similar to the tactics of Jörg Haider.25 However, this did not work because Proporz was 
not reformed; thus Vranitzky’s image failed. Müller, Plasser and Ulram emphasise that 
studies and opinion show that the 1990 victory was more to do with Heinz Fischer’s 
                                                
22 Sully (1986) ‘Austrian Social Democracy’, pp. 166-167.  
23 Ibid, p. 167.  
24 Ibid, p. 168.  
25 Wolfgang C. Müller and Fritz Plasser (1992) ‘Austria: The 1990 Campaign’, in Shaun Bowler and David 
M. Farrell (eds), Electoral Strategies and Political Marketing, St Martins Press, New York, pp. 26-27, 34-35, 40. 
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“votes on credit” and the expectation of reforms of the system and SPÖ itself rather than a 
preference for the SPÖ.26  
 
          Furthermore, the situation of a grand coalition raises the question of how reform 
could occur while government involved both Lagerparteien, including interest group 
elements intent on continuing corporatism. The leadership of Vrantisky and Klima was 
unable to reform Proporz because it still practiced patronage and corporatism. One 
famous example was the 1997 sale of remaining government shares in Creditanstalt bank, 
under ÖVP domain, preferably to a private interest. The ÖVP demanded that it be sold 
to another ÖVP-linked bank, Raifeisenbank, but was instead sold to SPÖ-linked Bank 
Austria.27 This is an example that shows party leadership, despite voicing reformism, 
were practicing Proporz. Failure of the SPÖ was evident in the 1994 elections. SPÖ voter 
share fell from 42.8% to 34.9%, despite the main SPÖ selling point again being 
Vranitzky’s successes such as Austria joining the EU, which passed with significant 
support in a 1994 referendum.28 The inability of the SPÖ to reach out to voters with a 
more libertarian left leaning was a missed opportunity because it potentially sacrificed its 
appeal to white collar liberals that the SPÖ wanted and had the initial support of. By 
1999, 18% and 9% of the vote from the liberal Grünen and LIF (socially liberal) (7.3% 
and 3.4% of vote respectively) respectively came from those who had voted SPÖ in 
1995; about 2% potentially lost from the SPÖ.29 Many white collar voters wanting real 
reforms would have also voted FPÖ.  
 
                                                
26 Müller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) ‘Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria: 
Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap’, p. 152. 
27 Luther (2007) ‘Must What Goes Up Always Come Down?’ p. 70.  
28 Melanie A. Sully (1995) ‘The Austrian Election of 1994’, in Electoral Studies, Vol. 14, Issue 2, pp. 220-221.  
29 Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und 
Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 12.  
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         At the same time, the SPÖ, in shifting focus away their old blue collar base did not 
retain enough of it. The SPÖ was unable to retain the support of much of its base 
because of economic privatisation and deregulation that helped the SPÖ gain white 
collar votes often isolated traditional supporters. The blue collar vote went from 53% in 
1990 to 35% in 1999, while the FPÖ went from 21% to 47% in the same period.30  
Though there is precedent for blue collar appeals to be successful for new-populist 
parties, such as with the Republican Party in the USA, Austria is significant insofar as the 
FPÖ won a plurality of blue collar votes in 1999; signifying that the SPÖ focused too 
much away from their old base. Tactical appeals against the former ‘gatekeepers’ allowed 
the FPÖ to gain from free political spaces. Theoretically, the decline of the blue collar 
vote should have been balanced by white collar gains. However, white collar gains were 
unsustainable due to policies, and worsened by the disproportionate loss of blue collar 
votes.  
     
             There were at least some attempts to reform party organisation, though this 
failed. Besides the change in emphasis by Kreisky towards white collar voters, in the 
1980s and 1990s there were attempts to focus more on important, ‘quality of life’ social 
issues with ‘issue initiatives’ organised as party units open to non-members, a 
professional media organisation and the open primaries for candidates and list rankings 
on a Länder level.31 The central party also attempted to take more control of candidate 
selection. A major 1968 party reform was that “Persons whose election is in the interest of the 
National Council’s work irrespective of their place of residence, are to be nominated to one-fifth of the 
positions on the list of candidates”.32 20% of candidates who could better reflect party 
                                                
30 Ibid, p. 24.  
31 Müller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) ‘Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria: 
Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap’, pp. 155-156, 159.  
32 Stirnemann (1989) ‘Recruitment and Recruitment Strategies’, p. 408.  
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strategies such as technocrats, experts, celebrities or even underrepresented groups such 
as women could be have been placed high in rankings through central party intervention.  
 
           These reforms proved to be rather lacklustre in terms of ability to change the 
party. Social issues were not being seen as important by many rank and file members 
who preferred traditional ideological approaches to problems and were never taken 
seriously or were at all significant overall.33 The media campaign relied on too much spin 
around Klima rather than on targeting core groups. Focusing on Klima, “They managed to 
streamline his public statements to the extent that made Klima look like a puppet, repeating the spin 
doctor’s slogans time and time again, even if it was obvious that they did not provide the appropriate 
answer to questions put to him”.34 The open primaries depended on a 50% binding turnout, 
and the end result was apathy and opposition which resulted in the 1994 election 
primaries applying to two Länder, Vorarlberg and Burgenland; but even then few 
candidates proposed by the central party were rejected; many of whom would have been 
interest-group and auxiliary linked anyway.35 The only useful quota was the introduction 
of each gender being guaranteed 40% representation in party bodies.36 Local candidate 
selection was rather powerless and candidate selection continued largely along the same 
lines as in the past: party officials, hierarchy in auxiliary organisations, and ÖGB officials. 
Heinz Fischer argues that ranking and seniority tended to play a major factor in re-
election, pointing out that re-election for incumbent Nationalrat members from 1966, 
1970 and 1971 general elections was about 95% and was likely to continue on seniority 
principles and was hardly good for renewal of representatives.37  
 
                                                
33 Müller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) ‘Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria: 
Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap’, p. 155. 
34 Ibid, p. 156. 
35 Ibid, p. 159.  
36 Ibid, p. 156. 
37 Stirnemann (1989) ‘Recruitment and Recruitment Strategies’, pp. 418-419.  
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          The comparison to the FPÖ from the last chapter shows that the slower, less 
manoeuvrable SPÖ was unable to counter the FPÖ. Despite starting off well in terms of 
good tactics and appeal under the leadership of Kreisky from 1970-1983, the SPÖ 
eventually stalled in its effort in evolving from a class-mass party to a catch-all party. 
Successes under Kreisky were undermined by its organisational structure that made it 
unable to adapt to modern politics and therefore failed to have the impact they could 
have had against the FPÖ. ÖGB old left concerns undermined post-industrial 
environmental, liberal attempts at appeals to white collar voters; while economic 
attempts to appeal isolated many in the blue collar base.  
 
Chapter 4.3: The ÖVP and the Gradual Decline 
 
           Although there should have been potential for the ÖVP to win white collar votes, 
the ÖVP vote decline massively. In 1999 it received 26.9% of the vote and came third to 
the SPÖ and FPÖ respectively. Although elites attempted to reform the party and its 
approach since the 1950s, ÖVP internal power distribution among the three leagues 
restricted leadership from making necessary changes. Unlike the more straightforward 
SPÖ case of elite interference, this was more of a case of league deadlock and resistance 
towards policy changes.  
 
            The ÖVP was in a worse position than the SPÖ because it suffered from a 
bigger decline in its traditional voter bases. Firstly, the strong Catholic voter base that 
was more important to the ÖVP than other parties declined, with mass attendance on 
Sundays dropping from 33% in 1969 to 17% in 1990.38 The public became more secular 
and less religious, which cost the ÖVP a ready audience through traditional ties. 
                                                
38 Müller and Steininger (1994) ‘Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness: The Case of the Austrian 
Peoples Party, 1945-1992’, p. 6.  
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Secondly, the occupational bases of the self-employed and farmers fell to a combined 
11% of the electorate and 20% of ÖVP voters in 1999.39 Thirdly, ÖVP membership fell 
from a high of about 640,000* (13% of the electorate) in 1970 to about 485,000* (8%) in 
1995.40 Fourthly, like the SPÖ, the ÖVP over-represented these declining groups in 
terms of rank and file. In 1990 39.8% of membership were self employed and farmers, 
22.3% civil servants, 22.8% blue collar compared to 15.1% white collar.41  
 
          By the 1960s, spurred by the general elections of 1953 and 1959 where the SPÖ 
won plurality but not more seats, many within the ÖVP felt that the party needed to 
change and reach out to new voters by disassociating itself from the Proporz system. This 
was pushed within the party by a group of liberal reformers who believed that too many 
economic concessions had been made to the SPÖ so wanted an end to grand coalitions, 
and that liberal economics should be a major focus of the party.42 This culminated with 
the rise of Josef Klaus as leader of the party and Chancellor from 1964-1970. Klaus was 
the former Governor of Salzburg and former Minister of Finance, and was not directly 
linked to any of the ÖVP organisational leagues. Strongly involved in this group was the 
ÖAAB, who as an employees league, felt their views and composition better represented 
the electorate. 
 
           This began promisingly, with the 1966 general election leading to a single party 
majority government. On paper, cabinet was different, with eight ÖAAB ministers and 
some non-league members dominating cabinet including ÖAAB-linked Josef Taus as 
                                                
39 Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und 
Entscheidungsmotive’, pp. 11, 28.  
40 Luther (1998) ‘From Accommodation to Competition: The ‘Normalisation’ of the Second Republic’s 
Party System’, p. 127. 
Each of these figures is a rough average between the estimated minimum and maximum membership 
numbers of the OVP due to the likely incidence of double counting of organisational membership (1970 
720,000 to 561,000; 1995 522,000 to 419,250).  
41 Luther (1992) ‘Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System’, p. 56. 
42 Bluhm (1973) Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State, pp. 111-113.  
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Minister of Nationalised Industries, ÖAAB official Grete Rehor as Minster of Social 
Affairs, and some provincial politicians such as Franz Heutzenauer from Tyrol as 
Minister of the Interior.43 Despite the promises of reform, consensual politics continued 
in Austria during this governments rule. For example, of the 515 new laws introduced 
from 1966-1970, only 62 were passed with only ÖVP support.44 Furthermore, the 
inclusion of officials in government still allowed for Proporz to continue. Rehor, for 
example, was still within the sphere of corporatism as she was Deputy Chairwoman of 
the third largest union in Austria within the ÖGB: giving continued corporatist access to 
government, while the Ministers of Agriculture and Commerce continued to be from the 
ÖBB and ÖWB respectively. The structures of Proporz continued, including the Joint 
Commission on Prices and Wages. As a result, the ÖVP appeared rather motionless, 
without strong vision and appeal because of party structure and corporatist 
arrangements. In the 1970 general elections, the ÖVP lost its majority to the SPÖ.  
 
            Opposition should have theoretically provided the ÖVP with an incentive or 
ability to renew itself, but this was not to be the case. Unlike the SPÖ under Kreisky 
from 1967-1970, the ÖVP did not make a tactical and policy transformation. Although it 
was excluded from government at that time, Proporz and corporatism gave the ÖVP and 
its constituent leagues enough power to force compromise that it had no real incentive 
to make changes to strategy and policy. The vast majority of bills before the Nationalrat 
received support unanimously from both parties. The structures of corporatism were still 
in place that gave the ÖBB, ÖWB and ÖAAB a place in negotiations, such as the Joint 
Commission. A change of direction in terms of policy was attempted during the 1970s, 
but the changes were largely cosmetic. The Salzburg Program of 1972, abandoned after a 
short time, re-branded the party as representing the ‘progressive centre’ was strangely 
                                                
43 Ibid, pp. 105-106. 
44 Sully (1981) Political Parties and Elections in Austria, p. 72. 
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vague. Economic policies were still Austro-Keynesian and continued to share key 
positions with the SPÖ such as the maintenance of full employment through state 
intervention and welfare; instead, the party sold itself as not being the SPÖ.45. Despite 
the ascendancy of some younger politicians in the 1970s such as Josef Taus, as well as 
more influence of the ÖAAB wing of the party, the other leagues still had massive 
power. Given ÖVP interest entrenchment, it was unable to articulate an alternative 
vision to Kreisky’s SPÖ. 
 
        Only when economic crises in the 1980’s began as a result of budget deficits and 
economic stagnation was the ÖVP given another opportunity to adapt. With post-
industrial opportunities approaching on the right due to international trends towards 
centre-right neo-liberalism, but this proved difficult. A liberal wing, supported by ÖVP 
Chairman from 1991-1995, Erhard Busek, challenged the status quo on traditional 
corporatist arrangements in order to allow the ÖVP leadership to make necessary 
changes. “By clinging to the utmost principle of consensus, we have not implemented many sensible 
innovations. Conflicts over subject matters were avoided; sometimes, this costs more than it fetches…” 46 
The liberal wing wanted to target a neo-liberal, socially moderate Green space in order to 
attract urban, white collar employees. Busek’s successor, Wolfgang Schüssel, was also 
initially supportive. Indeed, both Busek and Schüssel were former Secretaries-General of 
the ÖWB; demonstrating that elite leadership, even if rooted in leagues, wanted change. 
However, unlike the SPÖ, ÖVP internal divisions where interest group elites blocked 
reforms; preventing the ÖVP from capturing new spaces.  
  
                                                
45 Wolfgang C. Müller (1988) ‘Conservatism and the Transformation of the Austrian Peoples Party’, in 
Brian Girvin (ed), The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism, SAGE Publications, London, pp. 105-107. 
46 Crepaz (1995) ‘An Institutional Dinosaur: Austrian Corporatism in the Post-Industrial Age’, p. 82.  
95
         Problems with the ÖVP in its inability to change lay with the founding structure. 
The ÖVP was a microcosm of Proporz itself: equally divided power built into a structural 
pillar, and based policy on interest areas monopolies and compromise. The leagues 
retained financial autonomy and membership of a league meant automatic membership 
of the ÖVP, autonomy over Länder league membership dues and had a monopoly on 
policy for respective areas and other decisions by a compromise between the three 
leagues.47 Given that the ÖAAB was in a clear minority position within the Chambers of 
Labour, it was the ÖBB and the ÖWB who had more power because of the highest 
number of members and the most funds.48 Although leadership wanted change, the 
division of the party into leagues prevented it from moving; analogous to the immobility 
of the grand coalition itself. Therefore, the party was paralysed by divisions between 
white collar employee appeals (liberals, ÖAAB, Busek) and traditional wings (some 
within both the ÖBB and ÖWB) who wished to retain patronage, protection against 
reforms, and retain corporatist approaches that appeared to oppose neo-liberalism; 
effectively immobilising it because of the veto-power that each faction retained.49 
 
          The opportunities looked promising, but in the end, the ÖVP declined. Though in 
the 1983 election the ÖVP broke the SPÖ majority in the Nationalrat, they were unable 
to capitalise on these gains in 1986, losing support and joining a grand coalition headed 
by the SPÖ Chancellor Vranitzky. There were several reasons for the failure to reach out 
to white collar voters, reflecting the internal division of the party. 
 
                                                
47 Müller and Steininger (1994) ‘Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness: The Case of the Austrian 
Peoples Party, 1945-1992’, pp. 12-13.  
48 Müller (1988) ‘Conservatism and the Transformation of the Austrian Peoples Party’, pp. 100-101. 
49 Fraser Duncan (2006) ‘A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline: The Dilemmas of the CDU, 
ÖVP and CDA in the 1990s’, in Government and Opposition, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 484-485.  
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          Firstly, although there were those within the party that called for neo-liberal 
solutions to deficit problems, the prevailing orthodoxy still advocated some Austro-
Keynesian measures to deficit such as increased spending measures on family benefits.50 
There were attempts at tax reforms, deregulation, efficiency and privatisation of some 
nationalised industries. However, ÖVP-style neo-liberalism was rather mild compared 
with other centre-right parties around the world. In 1986, it advocated a 50% cut in 
subsidies and funding of new technologies, which still accepted some fundamentals of 
Austro-Keynesian ‘intervention’.51 Essentially, much of the Proporz framework was kept 
in place. The inability of the ÖVP to position itself to the economic right allowed the 
FPÖ to take advantage by positioning itself as a ‘pro-market’ party; gaining many 
economically right wing votes. The frustration with internal gridlock was evident in the 
consideration by the ÖWB to leave the ÖVP and form a separate party.52 With far more 
organisational and policy freedom the FPÖ was able to outmanoeuvre the ÖVP to the 
economic right.  
 
          Secondly, the ÖVP was outmanoeuvred for white collar votes because it did not 
present a credible alternative as reformers. Although Busek disagreed with 
proportionality on the basis that it stifled ‘innovation’, league influence was a 
determining factor to remain in government. In the 1990 campaign, as opposed to the 
SPÖ’s ‘Vranitsky strategy’, the ÖVP did advocate an ‘eco-social market’ with an 
emphasis on the ÖVP economic competency as opposed to SPÖ incompetence; it did 
not focus on leadership and often resolved to just attack SPÖ policy without clear 
alternatives.53 Considering that the ÖVP was junior partner in government, it was hard 
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for many to see how the ÖVP could prove itself capable of delivering reforms. The 
continuation of league and Chamber influence hurt the ÖVP by association. One way 
was that leagues continued to dominate certain cabinet posts, with Schüssel, the former 
ÖWB Secretary-General, serving as Minister of Economic Affairs from 1989-1995. 
Another was the continuing collaboration of chambers and leagues; with the Chamber of 
Business and ÖGB cooperating against the liberalisation of shop trading hours.54 Rather 
than having the opportunity to portray themselves as neo-liberal reformers, the ÖVP 
appeared to be a party of the status quo because internal division prevented reform.  
 
           Thirdly, the ÖVP failed to take advantage of the rise of issue-based politics in 
order to appeal to moderates and white collar voters to the right because it contradicted 
league interests. A strong undercurrent for green issues in the party was given massive 
leeway when planning the Zukunftmanifest (Future Manifesto). However, the final 
approved document for the 1986 elections was watered down to a non-committal 
compromise due to the structural powers of the three leagues.55 Zwentendorf provided 
an opportunity which it took to opposing nuclear power, but this was more nuanced. 
Opposition was largely political; corporatist groups had already agreed to support nuclear 
power, including the ÖBB and ÖWB.56 Like the SPÖ, industrial economic 
considerations by internal interest groups prevented it from appealing to issue-based 
politics. Crepaz uses the example of a waste management bill in the Nationalrat, with the 
ÖVP split between a ‘green wing’ represented by the party and the business, anti-
environment wing of the party represented through the Chamber of Commerce.57   
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55 Müller (1988) ‘Conservatism and the Transformation of the Austrian Peoples Party’, pp. 110-112. 
56 Pelinka (1983) ‘The Nuclear Referendum in Austria’, pp. 254-256. 
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          What appears to have happened is that the ÖVP was squeezed between the SPÖ 
and the FPÖ in terms of reaching out to white collar voters. Furthermore, the ÖVP had 
to compete with Grünen and the LIF; which the ÖVP did lose voter bases to these more 
accountable parties. In 1999, 11% of Grünen voters and 16% of LIF voters had voted 
ÖVP in 1995. Given the environmental current within the Grünen and the liberal base of 
the LIF, the ÖVP clearly lost opportunities to retain votes by not reaching out. The end 
result was that in the general elections of 1999, the ÖVP came third with 26.9% of the 
vote; its worst result to date. Müller, Plasser and Ulram contend that by the mid 1990s 
the ÖVP, by trying to hold the core base while trying to extend beyond that base to the 
white collar new middle class, could not be reconciled because of Lager interest group 
versus reformist contradiction.58   
 
           Despite numerous attempts at reform, the ÖVP was still beholden to these 
corporatist interests. From the late 1960s and especially since the 1970 defeat, the 
reformers in the party made strong attempts to take away their power by diluting it.  
Firstly, there was an attempt at broader representation in the late 1960s by mandating 
that in the larger party bodies be divided by 48% ÖAAB members, 32% ÖBB, and 16% 
ÖWB in terms of representation; multiple policy committees, and in the 1970’s the youth 
and women’s organisations equal formal status as constituent organisations as the three 
leagues.59 Secondly, there were attempts for more central party control by having a 
certain proportion of candidates nominated by the central party eventually (10% won by 
Chairman Alois Mock in the 1980’s), more control over Länder and league membership 
being brought closer to the central party (1970’s and 1980’s), and fixed percentages of 
                                                
58 Müller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) ‘Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria: 
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Länder and league donations to the central party as decided by the central executive and 
collected by the Land organisations (1970s and 1980s).60  
 
          Most of these reforms were ineffective in creating real change, evident in the 
declining vote, because they were unable to sufficiently challenge the power of the 
leagues; thus leaving the party still largely unreflective of the electorate. Almost all of 
these reforms were enacted but did not challenge the fundamental power such as the 
control of the leagues over party finance and policy; still leaving them powerful. The 
most relevant proposal, being the one on the domination of the ÖAAB at the expense of 
the other leagues, may have worked, but was not adopted. The equalisation of women’s 
and youth branches with the leagues ignored the traditional authority and financial clout 
of the leagues and was unsuccessful.61 Furthermore, party control was still not centralised 
enough over the leagues. The agreed level of central control over candidate selection, 
agreed upon at 10% between Chairman Mock, is arguably not very effective; the only 
real change, Land organisation collection of dues, still ignored the problem of league 
membership being paramount.62 Like with the SPÖ, the tendency towards incumbency, 
based on seniority, loyalty and interest group ties, still existed.  
 
           It appears evident that the ÖVP was unwilling to substantially change its structure 
and tactics to become a catch-all party because vested corporatist interests, whether 
public or within parties, had too much to lose. ÖVP leaders did enact reforms but 
because of the consideration of influence of the autonomous bodies, leaders were unable 
to act rationally towards true change and therefore reforms were insufficient. Because 
                                                
60 Ibid, pp. 17-23.  
61 Ibid, pp. 17-18.  
62 Ibid, pp. 18-23.  
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the ÖVP did not appear to be a credible modernising force the FPÖ being more credible 
and flexible, was able to take the ÖVP bourgeois, white collar and blue collar base.  
 
Conclusion 
 
        The reason why the SPÖ and ÖVP were unable to halt the rise of the FPÖ was 
because they were incapable of adapting to the post-industrial environment of electorate 
expectations and needs by branching out to become catch-all parties. The SPÖ could 
have more successfully become more socially liberal, while the ÖVP, which should have 
become more economically neo-liberal, was instead outflanked and squeezed between 
the SPÖ and FPÖ. The leadership was unable to act rationally because of the strength of 
the traditional structures of corporatist interests and Proporz; resulting in the re-
emergence of the cartel. The inability to adapt from this culture resulted in the FPÖ 
being able to attract both white collar and traditional voters for both parties.  
 
            The SPÖ began from the mid 1980s with promise because of tactical and policy 
changes with help from Kreisky and Vranitzky, but was not bold enough to pursue a 
bold agenda of accountability reform in government because of internal considerations 
of ÖGB power and appealing to the base. The SPÖ still did retain white collar and blue 
collar workers but lost support from the former because lack of political accountability 
and reform, and the latter because of new found insecurity from SPÖ-led economic 
reforms. The attempt to balance with a catch-all party in a cartel situation led the SPÖ to 
lose support from all groups. Both the former but especially the latter were potential 
voters for the FPÖ. The ÖVP fared worse in attempting transition because of the 
traditional power bases and culture were more powerful in this party. It was unable to be 
bold or legitimate enough in terms of being a credible, conservative, neo-liberal 
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alternative to the SPÖ. The FPÖ was bolder than the ÖVP and statistics show that the 
FPÖ gained the most from the decline of the ÖVP. The SPÖ and ÖVP failed because 
they were unable to make that transition to catch-all parties without the cartel situation 
lurking in the shadows; while the FPÖ was able to be all it could be to all segments of 
the electorate.  
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Conclusion: Austria Parties, Adaptability, and the 
Importance of Party Organisation 
 
 
         This thesis argues that, in part, the FPÖ’s electoral successes reflected the inability 
of the SPÖ and ÖVP were unable to transform their policies and reach out to new 
voters, in response to the challenges of post-industrial politics. It suggests that the 
organisations of these parties prevented them from doing so. The ability of their 
leadership to respond and adapt to new challenges was shaped by the structure of power 
in each organisation. Any entrenched interest, when threatened, will fight back, but, the 
degree of its success will be influenced by how much power it has within the 
organisational structure.  
 
         In the case of the Lagerparteien, leadership attempts to respond to post-industrial 
political realignment by changing policies and appeals were severely restrained by their 
internal Lager economic interests. SPÖ leadership knew to reach out to socially liberal 
political spaces of white collar voters on issues such as the environment and work-life 
balance, but evidence shows ÖGB interference based on ‘old-left’ understandings 
stunted these attempts. ÖVP leadership attempts at reorientation towards white collar, 
economically right spaces by adopting meaningful, neo-liberal positions was hindered by 
entrenched interests of the ÖBB and ÖWB. Both Lagerparteien were limited also by the 
corporatist entrenchment and domination of each party, resulting in grand coalition 
government and the continuation of Proporz. The challenge of the FPÖ succeeded in part 
because the Lagerparteien could not effectively respond to challenges. The FPÖ took 
advantage of these inabilities to position itself in order to target, specifically, social 
authoritarian, blue collar, former SPÖ voters; and economically right wing, white collar 
spaces that the ÖVP needed.   
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          The Austrian case study of the adaptation of the SPÖ and ÖVP to the challenges 
of post-industrial politics explains well the pitfalls of self-interested, entrenched groups 
within party organisations; especially given the challenge from the FPÖ. From 1945 
onward, consociational and corporatist governance continued in Austria because of the 
entrenchment of specific economic interests that cooperated within parties and between 
each other to ensure their positions in cabinet, the Nationalrat, the bureaucracy, and as 
corporatist negotiators. Consociational governance occurred in 1945 because of the 
consequences of the Second World War, the threat of Communism, and the need for a 
national identity through working together. This thesis extended Lijphart’s theory of 
consociationalism through explaining the continuance of consociationalism beyond 
being a “temporary expedient” in national crises becoming an institutionalised solution.  
 
 
           Entrenched interest group power within each party enjoyed newfound positions 
of influence from being in power and protecting their economic interests, so used their 
power to retain Proporz and, when possible, consociational government. Proporz provided 
entrenched interest group incentive to remain within the status quo; using a cartel of 
interests and parties to protect their interests. The SPÖ was dominated by the ÖGB and 
vice versa, the ÖVP by a cartel of the ÖAAB, ÖBB and ÖWB and vice versa; while each 
interest group held powerful corporatist positions within their own chambers and 
between each other as negotiators. Industrial roots of the predecessor SDAPÖ and CS 
lay in sub-cultural, segmental autonomous Lager; a combination of occupational and 
political representation based on specific ideological and economic interests.  
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          The formation of cultural identity around Lager combined with the degree of 
hierarchical and entrenched control made party policies dependent on interest groups 
and vice versa. It is hardly difficult to determine that powerful interest group officials 
tended to also serve in powerful positions of their respective parties and vice versa. 
Cabinet was the best government example; with the ÖGB dominating Social Welfare for 
the SPÖ; and the ÖAAB dominating Commerce, ÖBB running Agriculture, and the 
ÖWB in charge of Finance for the ÖVP. Presidents of the ÖGB served in high ranking 
positions in the SPÖ, while leaders of the ÖVP tended to be former officials in 
constituent leagues. Each Chamber and organisation was dominated by politically-
affiliated lists dominating their interest areas. On a lower level, the workplace, ideological 
organisations, student groups, even hobbies were dominated by a ‘cradle to the grave’ 
system of auxiliary organisations. They provided ideological comfort, patronage for 
those in need of resources through their control of ministries or land governments and 
those who wanted to climb the ranks. Those who disagreed with the general direction 
were expelled or sidelined.  
 
           This system could only work well as long as the bulk of the population were 
under the direct influence and network of the Lager. Post-industrialisation of Austria 
undermined Lagerparteien by undermining their bases. The decline of rural farmers, small 
businesses and religion undermined the ability of Catholic networks to remain powerful, 
as did the decline of blue collar industry. The replacement of these groups by white 
collar employees, who did not fall under Lager patronage networks, undermined the 
almost assured turnout of voters for the Lagerparteien and made them weaker. 
Furthermore, the impact of changes of globalisation and neo-liberal thinking 
undermined the role of ‘gatekeepers’ that the Lagerparteien had. As a result of this, the 
support of the Lagerparteien fell from a combined high of nearly 90% during most of the 
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post war years until 1986, to 60% in 1999. Not only did they lose the support of white 
collar workers, but also former Lager bases; overwhelmingly to the FPÖ 
 
            This thesis investigated the case of the challenge of the FPÖ and its successes in 
taking advantage of untargeted political spaces. The challenge for the SPÖ and ÖVP was 
to adapt and shift themselves towards becoming libertarian left and authoritarian right 
parties respectively, but, given the continuance of consociational governance, Proporz and 
corporatism, these parties’ moves were minimal at best and remained close around a 
status quo at the centre of the axis. The FPÖ took advantage by reorienting itself on two 
main fronts to take advantage of the open political spaces of the ‘losers’ (social 
conservative) and winners (white collar tending towards economic right). Firstly, it 
focused on the ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation, ie, the industrial bases of both parties, by 
using a socially authoritarian appeal of welfare insecurity, targeting immigrants and 
‘welfare cheats’; while using an overall theme of neo-conservative nostalgia and structure. 
Secondly, it focused on the ‘winners’ of post-industrialisation; white collar employees, by 
appealing to the centre and economic right. The centre was appealed to through 
attacking the SPÖ and ÖVP over lack of accountability of Proporz and corporatism, and 
promising to reform the system along democratic lines. The economic right was 
appealed to by espousing economic policies to the right of the ÖVP such as lower taxes, 
deregulation and privatisation. The targeting of the winners hurt the ÖVP the most.  
 
           The result of FPÖ success can be attributed mainly to the ability of the FPÖ to 
squeeze the ÖVP between the SPÖ on the left and itself. To unify sections of society 
into a cross-societal alliance was achievable because the FPÖ was easily able to navigate 
around the perception a ‘classless society’ by framing a new ‘us’ versus a new ‘them’ 
made up of cultural and political elites, and created ‘enemies’ of society such as 
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immigrants and welfare cheats. This was something that the Grünen and LIF could not 
do; as ideological niches of the post-industrial left and right, they could not break out of 
white collar left and right ‘ideological ghettos’ respectively. Compared to the large, 
inefficient party machines of the SPÖ and ÖVP, the FPÖ had virtually no ties to 
economic interests and a rather simple yet efficient party structure. In 1999, the FPÖ 
had destroyed the party status quo of Lagerparteien dominance. 
 
           The response of the Lagerparteien was insufficient because of party organisational 
power distribution. Despite attempts by party leadership, SPÖ and ÖVP attempts to 
adapt and reposition themselves failed because they were undermined by self-interested 
interest groups who had the aim of self-preservation and protection of their power and 
positions as paramount. The continuation of Proporz through corporatism, patronage and 
bipartisan legislation confirmed the underlying power of interest groups. With the SPÖ, 
Kreisky attempted to reform the party from 1967 onwards towards a liberal, centre-left 
focus, but was always mindful of the influence of the ÖGB under Anton Benya. Despite 
the attempts of the leftist approach, the pragmatists and the ÖGB undermined attempts 
to adapt and reposition the party along libertarian left, issues based politics. Issue after 
issue, including nuclear power, arms sales to South American dictators, pollution laws 
and work hour liberalisation, were struck down because ÖGB organisational power 
within the party gave it power to enforce its rather ‘old left’ industrial based outlook. 
Attempts to attract white collar voters under Vranitzky and Klima were not overly 
successful because they appeared insincere in the face of grand coalition government and 
the continuation of Proporz; while the party isolated much of its blue collar support in its 
attempts to target white collar voters with some pro-market policies. Any real attempts 
to change party organisation were defeated by stronger forces or insufficient to 
guarantee freedom of leadership to adapt.  
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          Similarly, the ÖVP failed to transform into a party of the economically liberal, 
socially conservative centre-right because of the entrenched interests; the leagues. The 
domination of the ÖAAB, ÖBB, and ÖWB, each financially and organisationally 
autonomous and with membership loyalty paramount over party membership, left the 
ÖVP trapped from making meaningful change. The ÖVP under Josef Klaus from 1964-
1970 was the closest to change, yet failed because powerful interests maintained Proporz 
and corporatism rather than going down the path of liberal economics. The ÖVP also 
failed to adapt to issue based politics such as the environment, to reform organisational 
power balances, and to take advantages of the failures of the SPÖ. Although economic 
policies became more pro-market, this was not far enough on the basis of international 
trends, the retaining of many Austro-Keynesian features, and the continuation of grand 
coalition governance, corporatism and Proporz. Without opposition and a vow to 
dismantle Proporz, the ÖVP could not be credible. Despite reform attempts, real party 
power lay with the leagues; who did not want their positions inside the party or as 
corporatist negotiators challenged. As a result, the FPÖ was able to outflank the ÖVP to 
the right, economically, socially and issues-wise; while the ÖVP ended the 1999 elections 
in third place.   
 
            This thesis would not be complete without a prologue that would reflect the 
general argument of the importance of party organisation. In 2000, because of the lack 
of options and perhaps in order to save itself, the ÖVP joined in coalition government 
with the FPÖ. Led by Wolfgang Schüssel of the ÖVP, the government enacted pro-
market measures such as a balanced budget, cuts to social services, privatisation of 
nationalised industries, and tax cuts. Ironically, this is what the ÖVP should have and the 
leadership may have wanted to do but were prevented by party organisation. In a snap 
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election in 2002, the ÖVP succeeded in attracting white collar voters; winning 42.3% of 
the vote to the SPÖ on 36.51%. Although the FPÖ campaigned against the state, by 
participating in government meant that, as an anti-statist populist party, it became part of 
the system it claimed to despise. Due to infighting and without their leader Haider in 
government, their share of the vote collapsed to 10.01%. After the 2006 general 
elections, due to a lack of options, the largest party, the SPÖ, entered into a grand 
coalition government with the ÖVP. One can determine from this that perhaps an 
electoral earthquake can force a party to change, but, the re-emergence of grand coalition 
governance may have given Proporz another opportunity, or it may just be a temporary 
situation. 
 
           This thesis concludes by stating that party organisation is the key to a political 
party’s ability to adapt to new environments and circumstances. The entrenchment of 
economic, industrial interest groups within the SPÖ and ÖVP meant that institutions 
based on industrial understandings that would prove difficult in new environments were 
entrenched in post-industrial Austria despite their undermined bases. Parties are not 
rational bodies; they are a sum of parts.         
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